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作者：Auerbach, Eric
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：How can one determine whether a treatment, such as the introduction of a social program or trade shock, alters agents' incentives to form links in a network? This paper proposes analogs of a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, widely used in the literature to test the null hypothesis of no treatment effects, for network data. It first specifies a testing problem in which the null hypothesis is that two networks are drawn from the same random graph model. It then describes two randomization tes...
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作者：Hansen, Bruce E.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper presents finite-sample efficiency bounds for the core econometric problem of estimation of linear regression coefficients. We show that the classical Gauss-Markov theorem can be restated omitting the unnatural restriction to linear estimators, without adding any extra conditions. Our results are lower bounds on the variances of unbiased estimators. These lower bounds correspond to the variances of the the least squares estimator and the generalized least squares estimator, depending...
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作者：Chandrasekher, Madhav; Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Le Yaouanq, Yves
作者单位：Yale University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; University of Munich
摘要：We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity, where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the DM's ambiguity attitude, and we show that it provides a unified framework through which to characterize different degrees of ambiguity aversion, and to represent the co-existence of negative and positive am...
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作者：Lagos, Ricardo; Zhang, Shengxing
作者单位：New York University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We formulate a generalization of the traditional medium-of-exchange function of money in contexts where there is imperfect competition in the intermediation of credit, settlement, or payment services used to conduct transactions. We find that the option to settle transactions with money strengthens the stance of sellers of goods and services in relation to intermediaries, and show this mechanism is operative even for sellers who never exercise the option to sell for money. These latent money d...
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作者：van den Berg, Gerard J.; Vikstrom, Johan
作者单位：University of Groningen; Uppsala University; Uppsala University; Uppsala University
摘要：We propose and implement a new method to estimate treatment effects in settings where individuals need to be in a certain state (e.g., unemployment) to be eligible for a treatment, treatments may commence at different points in time, and the outcome of interest is realized after the individual left the initial state. An example concerns the effect of training on earnings in subsequent employment. Any evaluation needs to take into account that some of those who are not trained at a certain time...
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作者：Chernozhukov, Victor; Newey, Whitney K.; Singh, Rahul
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Many causal and structural effects depend on regressions. Examples include policy effects, average derivatives, regression decompositions, average treatment effects, causal mediation, and parameters of economic structural models. The regressions may be high-dimensional, making machine learning useful. Plugging machine learners into identifying equations can lead to poor inference due to bias from regularization and/or model selection. This paper gives automatic debiasing for linear and nonline...
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作者：Perez-Richet, Eduardo; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We study the optimal design of tests with manipulable inputs. Tests take a unidimensional state of the world as input and output, an informative signal to guide a receiver's approve or reject decision. The receiver wishes to only approve states that comply with her baseline standard. An agent with a preference for approval can covertly falsify the state of the world at a cost. We characterize receiver-optimal tests and show they rely on productive falsification by compliant states. They work b...
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作者：Fenizia, Alessandra
作者单位：George Washington University
摘要：This paper studies the impacts of managers in the administrative public sector using novel Italian administrative data containing an output-based measure of productivity. Exploiting the rotation of managers across sites, I find that a one standard deviation increase in managerial talent raises office productivity by 10%. These gains are driven primarily by the exit of older workers who retire when more productive managers take over. I use these estimates to evaluate the optimal allocation of m...
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作者：La'O, Jennifer; Tahbaz-Salehi, Alireza
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University; Northeastern University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies the optimal conduct of monetary policy in a multisector economy in which firms buy and sell intermediate goods over a production network. We first provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the monetary policy's ability to implement flexible-price equilibria in the presence of nominal rigidities and show that, generically, no monetary policy can implement the first-best allocation. We then characterize the optimal policy in terms of the economy's production network and...
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作者：Norets, Andriy; Pelenis, Justinas
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We consider nonparametric estimation of a mixed discrete-continuous distribution under anisotropic smoothness conditions and a possibly increasing number of support points for the discrete part of the distribution. For these settings, we derive lower bounds on the estimation rates. Next, we consider a nonparametric mixture of normals model that uses continuous latent variables for the discrete part of the observations. We show that the posterior in this model contracts at rates that are equal ...
