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作者：Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing
作者单位：Kyoto University; University of Osaka; University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double-crossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where the indifference curves of two types cross twice, such that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they pool in a pairwise fashion, with a gap separating the actions chosen by these two sets of types. The result...
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作者：Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou
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作者：Sonmez, Tayfun; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：Sanctioned by its constitution, India is home to the world's most comprehensive affirmative action program, where historically discriminated groups are protected with vertical reservations implemented as set asides, and other disadvantaged groups are protected with horizontal reservations implemented as minimum guarantees. A mechanism mandated by the Supreme Court in 1995 suffers from important anomalies, triggering countless litigations in India. Foretelling a recent reform correcting the fla...
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作者：Adamopoulos, Tasso; Brandt, Loren; Leight, Jessica; Restuccia, Diego
作者单位：York University - Canada; University of Toronto; CGIAR; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use household-level panel data from China and a quantitative framework to document the extent and consequences of factor misallocation in agriculture. We find that there are substantial within-village frictions in both the land and capital markets linked to land institutions in rural China that disproportionately constrain the more productive farmers. These frictions reduce aggregate agricultural productivity by affecting two key margins: (1) the allocation of resources across farmers (misa...
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作者：Baillon, Aurelien; Halevy, Yoram; Li, Chen
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; University of Toronto; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Facing several decisions, people may consider each one in isolation or integrate them into a single optimization problem. Isolation and integration may yield different choices, for instance, if uncertainty is involved, and only one randomly selected decision is implemented. We investigate whether the random incentive system in experiments that measure ambiguity aversion provides a hedge against ambiguity, making ambiguity-averse subjects who integrate behave as if they were ambiguity neutral. ...
