作者：Bliss, C; DiTella, R
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Corrupt agents (officials or gangsters) exact money from firms. Corruption affects the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium. The degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures. Increases in competition may not lower corruption. The model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit. Assessing the welfare effect of corrupti...
作者：SchmittGrohe, S; Uribe, M
摘要：A traditional argument against a balanced-budget fiscal policy rule is that it amplifies business cycles by stimulating aggregate demand during booms via tax cuts and higher public expenditures and by reducing demand during recessions through a corresponding fiscal contraction. This paper suggests an additional source of instability that may arise from this ripe of fiscal policy rule, It shows that: within the standard neoclassical growth model, a balanced-budget rule can make expectations of ...
