Does competition kill corruption?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bliss, C; DiTella, R
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/262102
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 1001-1023
• 关键词: seeking

摘要

Corrupt agents (officials or gangsters) exact money from firms. Corruption affects the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium. The degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures. Increases in competition may not lower corruption. The model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit. Assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social welfare.