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作者：Becker, GS; Murphy, KM; Grossman, M
作者单位：University of Chicago; City University of New York (CUNY) System; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper considers the costs of reducing consumption of a good by making its production illegal and punishing apprehended illegal producers. We use illegal drugs as a prominent example. We show that the more inelastic either demand for or supply of a good is, the greater the increase in social cost from further reducing its production by greater enforcement efforts. So optimal public expenditures on apprehension and conviction of illegal suppliers depend not only on the difference between th...
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作者：Perotti, EC; von Thadden, EL
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; University of Mannheim
摘要：In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the great reversal phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several financially developed countries a financially weak...
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作者：Brown, JD; Earle, JS; Telegdy, A
作者单位：Heriot Watt University; Central European University; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Institute of Economics - HAS; Hungarian Academy of Sciences
摘要：This paper estimates the effect of privatization on multifactor productivity using comprehensive panel data on initially state-owned manufacturing firms in four economies. We exploit the data's longitudinal dimension to control for preprivatization selection and estimate long-run impacts. The estimates are robust to functional form but sensitive to selection controls. Our preferred random growth estimates imply positive multifactor productivity effects of 15 percent in Romania, 8 percent in Hu...
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作者：List, JA
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The role of the market in mitigating and mediating various forms of behavior is perhaps the central issue facing behavioral economics today. This study designs a field experiment that is explicitly linked to a controlled laboratory experiment to examine whether, and to what extent, social preferences influence outcomes in actual market transactions. While agents drawn from a well-functioning marketplace behave in accord with social preference models in tightly controlled laboratory experiments...
