The political economy of corporate control and labor rents
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Perotti, EC; von Thadden, EL
署名单位：
University of Amsterdam; University of Mannheim
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-3808
DOI：
10.1086/500278
发表日期：
2006
页码：
145-174
关键词：
摘要：
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the great reversal phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several financially developed countries a financially weakened middle class became concerned about labor income risk associated with free markets and supported a more corporatist financial system.
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