-
作者：Chen, M. Keith; Lakshminarayanan, Venkat; Santos, Laurie R.
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：Behavioral economics has demonstrated systematic decision-making biases in both lab and field data. Do these biases extend across contexts, cultures, or even species? We investigate this question by introducing fiat currency and trade to a colony of capuchin monkeys and recovering their preferences over a range of goods and gambles. We show that capuchins react rationally to both price and wealth shocks but display several hallmark biases when faced with gambles, including reference dependence...
-
作者：List, JA
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The role of the market in mitigating and mediating various forms of behavior is perhaps the central issue facing behavioral economics today. This study designs a field experiment that is explicitly linked to a controlled laboratory experiment to examine whether, and to what extent, social preferences influence outcomes in actual market transactions. While agents drawn from a well-functioning marketplace behave in accord with social preference models in tightly controlled laboratory experiments...
-
作者：Kuziemko, Ilyana; Werker, Eric
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Ten of the 15 seats on the U. N. Security Council are held by rotating members serving two-year terms. We find that a country's U. S. aid increases by 59 percent and its U. N. aid by 8 percent when it rotates onto the council. This effect increases during years in which key diplomatic events take place (when members' votes should be especially valuable), and the timing of the effect closely tracks a country's election to, and exit from, the council. Finally, the U. N. results appear to be driv...
-
作者：Cagetti, Marco; De Nardi, Mariacristina
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This paper constructs and calibrates a parsimonious model of occupational choice that allows for entrepreneurial entry, exit, and investment decisions in the presence of borrowing constraints. The model fits very well a number of empirical observations, including the observed wealth distribution for entrepreneurs and workers. At the aggregate level, more restrictive borrowing constraints generate less wealth concentration and reduce average firm size, aggregate capital, and the fraction of ent...
-
作者：Smith, Lones
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Consider a heterogeneous agent matching model in which the payoff of each matched individual is a fixed function of both partners' types. In a 1973 article, Becker showed that assortative matching arises in a frictionless setting simply if everyone prefers higher partners. This paper shows that if finding partners requires time-consuming search and individuals are impatient, then productive interaction matters. Matching is positively assortative-higher types match with higher sets of types-whe...
-
作者：Barberà, S; Jackson, MO
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation structu...
