On the weights of nations: Assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous union

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barberà, S; Jackson, MO
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/501172
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 317-339
• 关键词: decision-rules; MAJORITY RULES; POWER; allocation; council; EU

摘要

We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation structure of agents' preferences, and then we compare the voting weights in the Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed Constitution.