The marriage model with search frictions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Smith, Lones
署名单位：
University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-3808
DOI：
10.1086/510440
发表日期：
2006
页码：
1124-1144
关键词：
摘要：
Consider a heterogeneous agent matching model in which the payoff of each matched individual is a fixed function of both partners' types. In a 1973 article, Becker showed that assortative matching arises in a frictionless setting simply if everyone prefers higher partners. This paper shows that if finding partners requires time-consuming search and individuals are impatient, then productive interaction matters. Matching is positively assortative-higher types match with higher sets of types-when the proportionate gains from having better partners rise in one's type. With multiplicatively separable payoffs, these proportionate gains are constant in one's type, and block segregation arises, a common finding of the literature.