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作者：Genakos, Christos; Pagliero, Mario
作者单位：Athens University of Economics & Business; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：We empirically study the impact of interim rank on risk taking and performance using data on professionals competing in tournaments for large rewards. As we observe both the intended action and the performance of each participant, we can measure risk taking and performance separately. We present two key findings. First, risk taking exhibits an inverted-U relationship with interim rank. Revealing information on relative performance induces individuals trailing just behind the interim leaders to...
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作者：Lefgren, Lars; Lindquist, Matthew J.; Sims, David
作者单位：Brigham Young University; Stockholm University
摘要：We construct a simple model, consistent with Becker and Tomes, that decomposes the intergenerational income elasticity into the causal effect of financial resources, the mechanistic transmission of human capital, and the role that human capital plays in the determination of fathers' permanent incomes. We show how a particular set of instrumental variables could separately identify the money and human capital transmission effects. Using data from a 35 percent sample of Swedish sons and their fa...
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作者：Arseneau, David M.; Chugh, Sanjay K.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Boston College; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW)
摘要：The optimality of tax smoothing is reexamined using frictional labor markets. In a calibrated matching model that generates empirically relevant labor market fluctuations conditional on exogenous fiscal policy, the Ramsey-optimal policy calls for extreme labor tax rate volatility. Purposeful tax volatility induces dramatically smaller, but efficient, fluctuations of labor markets by keeping distortions constant over the business cycle. We relate the results to standard Ramsey theory by develop...
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作者：Li, Yiting; Rocheteau, Guillaume; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：National Taiwan University; University of California System; University of California Irvine; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study an over-the-counter (OTC) market in which the usefulness of assets as a means of payment or collateral is limited by the threat of fraudulent practices. Agents can produce fraudulent assets at a positive cost, which generates upper bounds on the quantity of each asset that can be traded in the OTC market. Each of these endogenous, asset-specific, resalability constraints depends on the cost of fraud, on the frequency of trade, and on the asset price. In equilibrium, assets are partiti...
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作者：Harstad, Bard
作者单位：University of Oslo; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Free-riding is at the core of environmental problems. If a climate coalition reduces its emissions, world prices change and nonparticipants typically emit more; they may also extract the dirtiest type of fossil fuel and invest too little in green technology. The coalition's second-best policy distorts trade and is not time consistent. However, suppose that the countries can trade the rights to exploit fossil-fuel deposits: As soon as the market clears, the above-mentioned problems vanish and t...
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作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Oreffice, Sonia; Quintana-Domeque, Climent
作者单位：Columbia University; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：We construct a marriage market model of matching along multiple dimensions, some of which are unobservable, in which individual preferences can be summarized by a one-dimensional index combining the various characteristics. We show that, under testable assumptions, these indices are ordinally identified and that the male and female trade-offs between their partners' characteristics are overidentified. Using PSID data on married couples, we recover the marginal rates of substitution between bod...
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作者：Stoop, Jan; Noussair, Charles N.; Van Soest, Daan
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：We conduct a field experiment to measure cooperation among groups of recreational fishermen at a privately owned fishing facility. Group earnings are greater when group members catch fewer fish. Consistent with classical economic theory, though in contrast to prior results from laboratory experiments, we find no cooperation. A series of additional treatments identifies causes of the difference. We rule out the subject pool and the laboratory setting as potential causes and identify the type of...
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作者：Farhi, Emmanuel; Werning, Ivan
作者单位：Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Economies with private information provide a rationale for capital taxation. In this paper we ask what the welfare gains from following this prescription are. We develop a method to answer this question in standard general equilibrium models with idiosyncratic uncertainty and incomplete markets. We find that general equilibrium forces are important and greatly reduce the welfare gains. Once these effects are taken into account, the gains are relatively small in our benchmark calibration. These...
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作者：Krishnamurthy, Arvind; Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Investors value the liquidity and safety of US Treasuries. We document this by showing that changes in Treasury supply have large effects on a variety of yield spreads. As a result, Treasury yields are reduced by 73 basis points, on average, from 1926 to 2008. Both the liquidity and safety attributes of Treasuries are driving this phenomenon. We document this by analyzing the spread between assets with different liquidity (but similar safety) and those with different safety (but similar liquid...
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作者：Diamond, Douglas W.; Rajan, Raghuram G.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Banks finance illiquid assets with demandable deposits, which discipline bankers but expose them to damaging runs. Authorities may not want to stand by and watch banks collapse. However, unconstrained direct bailouts undermine the disciplinary role of deposits. Moreover, competition forces banks to promise depositors more, increasing intervention and making the system worse off. By contrast, constrained central bank intervention to lower rates maintains private discipline, while offsetting con...
