Liquidity and the Threat of Fraudulent Assets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Yiting; Rocheteau, Guillaume; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
• 署名单位: National Taiwan University; University of California System; University of California Irvine; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/668864
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 815-846
• 关键词: information; demand; MODEL

摘要

We study an over-the-counter (OTC) market in which the usefulness of assets as a means of payment or collateral is limited by the threat of fraudulent practices. Agents can produce fraudulent assets at a positive cost, which generates upper bounds on the quantity of each asset that can be traded in the OTC market. Each of these endogenous, asset-specific, resalability constraints depends on the cost of fraud, on the frequency of trade, and on the asset price. In equilibrium, assets are partitioned into three liquidity tiers, which differ in their resalability, prices, haircuts, sensitivity to shocks, and responses to policies.