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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Leading equilibrium concepts require agents' beliefs to coincide with the model's true probabilities and thus be free of systematic errors. This implicitly assumes a criterion that tests beliefs against the observed outcomes generated by the model. We formalize this requirement in stationary environments. We show that there is a tension between requiring that beliefs can be tested against systematic errors and allowing agents to disagree or be uncertain about the long-run fundamentals. We disc...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural single-crossing (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and present a number o...
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作者：Antras, Pol; Foley, C. Fritz
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the financing terms that support international trade. The choice of trade finance terms balances the risk that an importer defaults on an exporter and the possibility that an exporter does not deliver goods as specified. Analysis of transaction-level data from a US exporter reveals that importers located in countries with weak enforcement of contracts typically finance transactions, but these firms are able to overcome the constraints of such e...
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作者：Krusell, Per; Smith, Anthony A., Jr.
作者单位：University of Gothenburg; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University
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作者：Asparouhova, Elena; Bossaerts, Peter; Eguia, Jon; Zame, William
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of Melbourne; University of Bristol; Michigan State University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We present a theory and experimental evidence on pricing and portfolio choices under asymmetric reasoning. We show that under asymmetric reasoning, prices do not reflect all (types of) reasoning. Some agents who observe prices that cannot be reconciled with their reasoning switch from perceiving the environment as risky to perceiving it as ambiguous. If they are ambiguity-averse, these agents become price-insensitive. Results from an experiment show that, consistent with the theory, (i) withou...
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作者：Corbae, Dean; Quintin, Erwan
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：How much of the foreclosure crisis can be explained by the large number of high-leverage mortgages originated during the housing boom? In our model, heterogeneous households select from mortgages with different down payments and choose whether to default given income and housing shocks. The use of low-down payment loans is initially limited by payment-to-income requirements but becomes unrestricted during the boom. The model approximates key housing and mortgage market facts before and after t...
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作者：Doyle, Joseph J., Jr.; Graves, John A.; Gruber, Jonathan; Kleiner, Samuel A.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Vanderbilt University; Cornell University
摘要：We consider whether hospitals that receive higher payments from Medicare improve patient outcomes, using exogenous variation in ambulance company assignment among patients who live near one another. Using Medicare data from 2002-10 on assignment across ambulance companies and New York State data from 2000-6 on assignment across area boundaries, we find that patients who are brought to higher-cost hospitals achieve better outcomes. Our estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in M...
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作者：Esteban, Joan; Morelli, Massimo; Rohner, Dominic
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Bocconi University; University of Lausanne
摘要：We provide a model of conflict and mass killing decisions to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur. We predict that mass killings are most likely in countries with large amounts of natural resource rents, polarization, institutional constraints regarding rent sharing, and low productivity of labor. The role of resources such as oil, gas, and diamonds and other key determinants of mass killings is confirmed by our empirical results based on count...
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作者：Best, Michael Carlos; Brockmeyer, Anne; Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen; Spinnewijn, Johannes; Waseem, Mazhar
作者单位：Stanford University; The World Bank; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Manchester
摘要：To fight evasion, many developing countries use production-inefficient tax policies. This includes minimum tax schemes whereby firms are taxed on either profits or turnover, depending on which tax liability is larger. Such schemes create nonstandard kink points, which allow for eliciting evasion responses to switches between profit and turnover taxes using a bunching approach. Using administrative data on corporations in Pakistan, we estimate that turnover taxes reduce evasion by up to 60-70 p...
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作者：Kaur, Supreet; Kremer, Michael; Mullainathan, Sendhil
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：Self-control problems change the logic of agency theory by partly aligning the interests of the firm and worker: both now value contracts that elicit future effort. Findings from a year-long field experiment with full-time data entry workers support this idea. First, workers increase output by voluntarily choosing dominated contracts (which penalize low output but give no additional rewards for high output). Second, effort increases closer to (randomly assigned) paydays. Third, the contract an...
