Political Economy in a Changing World

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/682679
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1038-1086
• 关键词: equilibrium; persistence; DEMOCRACY; REFORM; games; MODEL

摘要

We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural single-crossing (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and present a number of comparative static results. We then use this framework to study the dynamics of political rights and repression in the presence of threats from extremist groups and the dynamics of collective experimentation.