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作者：Rouse, CE
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In 1990 Wisconsin began providing vouchers to a small number of low-income students to attend nonsectarian private schools. Controlling for individual fixed-effects, I compare the test scores of students selected to attend a participating private school with those of unsuccessful applicants and other students from the Milwaukee public schools. I find that students in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program had faster math score gains than, but similar reading score gains to, the comparison group...
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作者：de Meza, D; Lockwood, B
作者单位：University of Exeter
摘要：This paper studies the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) property rights approach to the theory of the firm under alternating-offers bargaining. When managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation, the GHM results obtain. If taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining, outcomes are very different. Sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with; sometimes independent assets should be own...
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作者：Cutler, DM; Reber, SJ
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use data on health plan choices by employees of Harvard University to compare the benefits of insurance competition with the costs of adverse selection. Moving to a voucher-type system induced significant adverse selection, with a welfare loss of 2 to 4 percent of baseline spending. But increased competition reduced Harvard's premiums by 5 to 8 percent. The premium reductions came from insurer profits, so while Harvard was better off, the net effect for society was only the adverse selectio...
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作者：Che, JH; Qian, YY
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Stanford University
摘要：We develop a theory of the ownership of firms in an environment without secure property rights against state encroachment. Private ownership leads to excessive revenue hiding, and state ownership (i.e., national government ownership) fails to provide incentives for managers and local governments in a credible way. Because local government ownership integrates local government activities and business activities, local government may better serve the interests of the national government, and thu...
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作者：Romer, D
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
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作者：Terra, CT
作者单位：Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro
