-
作者：Jayachandran, Seema; Lleras-Muney, Adriana
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Theory suggests that longer life expectancy encourages educational investment because a longer time horizon increases the value of investments that pay out over time. To estimate the magnitude of this effect, we examine a sudden drop in maternal mortality in Sri Lanka between 1946 and 1953, which sharply increased the life expectancy of girls. We assess whether girls' education relative to boys' increases more in areas with larger maternal mortality declines. We find that for every extra year ...
-
作者：Bayer, Patrick; Hjalmarsson, Randi; Pozen, David
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Yale University
摘要：This paper analyzes the influence that juvenile offenders serving time in the same correctional facility have on each other's subsequent criminal behavior. The analysis is based on data on over 8,000 individuals serving time in 169 juvenile correctional facilities during a two-year period in Florida. These data provide a complete record of past crimes, facility assignments, and arrests and adjudications in the year following release for each individual. To control for the nonrandom assignment ...
-
作者：Ferreira, Fernando; Gyourko, Joseph
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Are cities as politically polarized as states and countries? No is the answer from our regression discontinuity design analysis, which shows that whether the mayor is a Democrat or a Republican does not affect the size of city government, the allocation of local public spending, or crime rates. However, there is a substantial incumbent effect for mayors. We investigate three mechanisms that could account for the striking lack of partisan impact at the local level, and find the most support for...
-
作者：Calvet, Laurent E.; Campbell, John Y.; Sodini, Paolo
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper investigates the dynamics of individual portfolios in a unique data set containing the disaggregated wealth of all households in Sweden. Between 1999 and 2002, we observe little aggregate rebalancing in the financial portfolio of participants. These patterns conceal strong household-level evidence of active rebalancing, which on average offsets about one-half of idiosyncratic passive variations in the risky asset share. Wealthy, educated investors with better diversified portfolios ...
-
作者：Brown, Alexander L.; Chua, Zhikang Eric; Camerer, Colin F.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper tests two explanations for apparent undersaving in life cycle models: bounded rationality and a preference for immediacy. Each was addressed in a separate experimental study. In the first study, subjects saved too little initially-providing evidence for bounded rationality-but learned to save optimally within four repeated life cycles. In the second study, thirsty subjects who consume beverage sips immediately, rather than with a delay, show greater relative overspending, consistent...
-
作者：Bernheim, B. Douglas; Rangel, Antonio
作者单位：Stanford University; California Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We propose a broad generalization of standard choice-theoretic welfare economics that encompasses a wide variety of nonstandard behavioral models. Our approach exploits the coherent aspects of choice that those positive models typically attempt to capture. It replaces the standard revealed preference relation with an unambiguous choice relation: roughly, x is ( strictly) unambiguously chosen over y (written xP*y) iff y is never chosen when x is available. Under weak assumptions, P* is acyclic ...
-
作者：Hart, Oliver
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A contract fixing price works well in normal times because there is nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is unusually high or low, one party will deviate from the contract and hold up the other party, causing deadweight losses as parties withhold cooperation. We show that allocating asset ownership and indexing contracts can reduce the incentives to engage in hold-up. In...
