HOLD-UP, ASSET OWNERSHIP, AND REFERENCE POINTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hart, Oliver
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.267
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 267-300
• 关键词: long-term-contracts; vertical integration; price adjustment; indexation; firm

摘要

We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A contract fixing price works well in normal times because there is nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is unusually high or low, one party will deviate from the contract and hold up the other party, causing deadweight losses as parties withhold cooperation. We show that allocating asset ownership and indexing contracts can reduce the incentives to engage in hold-up. In contrast to much of the literature, the driving force in our model is payoff uncertainty, rather than noncontractible investments.