-
作者：Hassler, John; Krusell, Per; Olovsson, Conny
作者单位：Stockholm University; Sveriges Riksbank
摘要：We develop a quantitative macroeconomic theory of input-saving technical change to analyze how markets economize on scarce natural resources, with an application to fossil fuel. We find that aggregate US data call for a very low short-run substitution elasticity between energy and the capital/labor inputs. Our estimates imply that energy-saving technical change took off when the oil shocks hit in the 1970s. This response implies significant substitutability with the other inputs in the long ru...
-
作者：Callander, Steven; Lambert, Nicolas S.; Matouschek, Niko
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University
摘要：Expert advice often extends beyond a simple recommendation, including information about alternative options. To explore the role of this referential advice, we enrich the expert's informational advantage in a canonical model of communication with hard information. We show that when constructed just right, referential advice dissuades the decision maker from choosing options other than the recommendation, thereby making the recommendation itself more persuasive. We identify an equilibrium in wh...
-
作者：Ciliberto, Federico; Murry, Charles; Tamer, Elie
作者单位：University of Virginia; Boston College; Harvard University
摘要：We provide an econometric framework for estimating a game of simultaneous entry and pricing decisions while allowing for correlations between unobserved cost and demand shocks. We use our framework to account for selection in the pricing stage. We estimate the model using data from the US airline industry and find that not accounting for endogenous entry leads to biased estimation of demand elasticities. We simulate a merger between American and US Airways and find that product repositioning a...
-
作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We propose a new model of legislative bargaining in which coalitions may have different values, reflecting the fact that the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. As the delay between offers goes to zero, the equilibrium allocation of the model converges to a generalized version of a Nash bargaining solution in which-in contrast to the standard solution-the winning coalition is endogenous and determined by the relative coalitional values. A form of ...
-
作者：Heathcote, Jonathan; Tsujiyama, Hitoshi
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We explore the optimal shape of the income tax and transfer schedule in an environment with distinct roles for public and private insurance. In a calibration to the United States, we find that the optimal system features marginal tax rates that increase in income. When we increase pressure on the government to raise revenue, the optimal marginal tax schedule becomes first flatter and then U-shaped, reconciling various findings in the literature. A power function parametric tax schedule outperf...
-
作者：Caplin, Andrew; Martin, Daniel
作者单位：New York University; Northwestern University
摘要：We take the perspective of an econometrician who wants to determine which of two experiments provides higher expected utility but only knows the decisions under each experiment. To compare these decisions, the econometrician must make inferences about what the experiment might have been for each set of decisions. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition that identifies when every experiment consistent with one set of decisions has a higher value of information than every experiment cons...
