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作者:Simonov, Andrey; Rao, Justin
作者单位:Columbia University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要:We examine the nature of consumer demand for government-controlled online news outlets in Russia, testing whether such demand reflects a preference for progovernment ideological coverage or other factors unrelated to outlets' ideological positions. We detect government-sensitive topics and measure outlets' news-reporting decisions from news article texts, and we estimate a structural model of demand for news, using detailed browsing data that traces individual-level consumption. The average co...
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作者:Salz, Tobias
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:Intermediaries in decentralized markets can affect buyer welfare both directly, by reducing expenses for buyers with high search cost, and indirectly, through a search externality that affects the prices paid by buyers who do not use intermediaries. I investigate the magnitude of these effects in New York City's trade-waste market, where buyers can search either by themselves or through a waste broker. Combining elements from the empirical search and procurement auction literatures, I construc...
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作者:Carlson, Mark; Correia, Sergio; Luck, Stephan
作者单位:Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要:How does banking competition affect credit provision and growth? How does it affect financial stability? In order to identify the causal effects of banking competition, we exploit a discontinuity in bank capital requirements during the nineteenth-century National Banking Era. We show that banks operating in markets with lower entry barriers extend more credit. The resulting credit expansion, in turn, is associated with additional real economic activity. However, banks in markets with lower ent...
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作者:Jovanovic, Boyan; Menkveld, Albert J.
作者单位:New York University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要:If bidding in a pure common-value auction is costly and bidders do not know how many others are also bidding, all equilibria are in mixed strategies. Participation is probabilistic, and bid prices are dispersed. The symmetric equilibrium is unique and yields simple analytic expressions. We use them to, for example, show that bid prices exhibit negative skewness. The expressions are further used to estimate the model based on bidding on a Standard & Poor's 500 security. We find that the number ...
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作者:Andersen, Jorgen Juel; Johannesen, Niels; Rijkers, Bob
作者单位:BI Norwegian Business School; University of Copenhagen; The World Bank
摘要:Do elites capture foreign aid? This paper documents that aid disbursements to highly aid-dependent countries coincide with sharp increases in bank deposits in offshore financial centers known for bank secrecy and private wealth management but not in other financial centers. The estimates are not confounded by contemporaneous shocks-such as civil conflicts, natural disasters, and financial crises-and are robust to instrumenting using predetermined aid commitments. The implied leakage rate is ar...
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作者:Ravid, Doron; Roesler, Anne-Katrin; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位:University of Chicago; University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要:This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model in which the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she can privately purchase any signal about her valuation. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. The cost of a signal is smooth and increasing in informativeness. We characterize the set of equilibria when learning is free and show that they are strongly Pareto ranked. Our main result is that when learning is costly but the cost of information goes to zero, equilibria...