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作者：Gelber, Alexander; Moore, Timothy; Pei, Zhuan; Strand, Alexander
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Cornell University; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We show that higher payments from US Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) reduce mortality. Using administrative data on new DI beneficiaries, we exploit discontinuities in the benefit formula through a regression kink design. We estimate that $1,000 more in annual DI payments decreases the annual mortality rate of lower-income beneficiaries by approximately 0.18-0.35 percentage points, implying an elasticity of mortality with respect to DI income of around -0.6 to -1.0. We find no robust...
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作者：Angeletos, George-Marios; Collard, Fabrice; Dellas, Harris
作者单位：Northwestern University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Surrey; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：We study optimal policy in an economy where interest rates are low because public debt serves as collateral or buffer stock. Issuing more public debt raises welfare by easing the underlying friction but also reduces the private valuation of this service, raising interest rates. This trade-off shapes the optimal quantity of public debt in the long run, justifies a departure from tax smoothing in the short run, and calls for larger deficits during financial crises. Our analysis illustrates the p...
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作者：Crouzet, Nicolas; Gupta, Apoorv; Mezzanotti, Filippo
作者单位：Northwestern University; Dartmouth College
摘要：We provide evidence on the importance of coordination frictions in technology adoption, using data from a large provider of electronic wallets during the Indian demonetization. Exploiting geographical variation in exposure to the demonetization, we show that adoption of the wallet increased persistently in response to the large but temporary cash contraction, consistent with the predictions of a technology adoption model with complementarities. Model estimates indicate that adoption would have...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study informed persuasion, whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents' actions. We characterize the subset of Bayes-correlated equilibria yielding every designer type a payoff higher than what they could get from any disclosure mechanism with credible beliefs. This set of interim-optimal mechanisms is nonempty and tractable, and all its elements are perfect Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms of the informed-designer ...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; Lancaster University
摘要：We analyze the implications of priority service (PS) on customers' welfare. In monopoly markets, PS can often decrease consumer surplus and can even yield a loss of welfare to all consumers. This happens despite its efficiency gains, as monopolists levy in revenue more than the total efficiency gains. PS can increase consumer surplus if it expands the consumption coverage-that is, if it introduces new customers who would not purchase the service otherwise. In duopoly markets, the price competi...
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作者：Morelli, Juan M.; Moretti, Matias
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University of Rochester
摘要：We formulate a reputational model in which the type of government is time varying and private information. Agents adjust their beliefs about the government's type (i.e., reputation) using noisy signals about its policies. We consider a debt repayment setting in which reputation influences the market's perceived probability of default, which affects sovereign spreads. We focus on the 2007-12 Argentine episode of inflation misreport to quantify how markets price reputation. We find that the misr...
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作者：Fanning, Jack
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：How should mediators communicate with bargainers? When can they improve outcomes? Can arbitrators that impose outcomes do better? I provide answers in wars of attrition with flexible and commitment types, consistent with reputational bargaining. I characterize the unique mediated equilibrium, which maximizes flexible types' payoffs. The mediator immediately elicits private information but waits to suggest agreements. She front-loads agreements between flexible types, while initially delaying a...
