The Conservation Multiplier

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Harstad, Bard
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/723637
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY; reduce emissions; state capacity; deforestation; POLICY; incentives; extraction; payments; taxation; forests

摘要

Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or conserve it and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a positive theory of this situation and shows when a small change in parameter values has a multiplier effect on exploitation. The multiplier strengthens the influence of a lobby paying for exploitation and of a donor compensating for conservation. A successful donor pays every period for each unit; a successful lobby pays once. This asymmetry causes inefficient exploitation. A normative analysis uncovers when compensations are optimally offered to the party in power, to the general public, or to the lobby.