-
作者：Aizawa, Naoki; Ko, Ami
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research; Georgetown University
摘要：While the traditional role of insurers is to provide protection against individuals' idiosyncratic risks, insurers themselves face substantial uncertainties due to aggregate shocks. To prevent insurers from passing these aggregate risks onto consumers, governments have increasingly adopted dynamic pricing regulations, which limit insurers' ability to change premiums over time. We evaluate dynamic pricing regulation using an equilibrium model of the US long-term care insurance market, featuring...
-
作者：Slattery, Cailin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：State and local governments in the United States compete to attract firms by offering discretionary subsidies. I use a private value English auction to model the subsidy bidding process and quantify the welfare effects of competition. The allocation of rents between states and firms depends on the heterogeneity in states' valuations for firms and the substitutability of locations. I find that competition increases welfare by less than 5% over a subsidy ban, and states compete away the surplus,...
-
作者：Deserranno, Erika; Caria, A. Stefano; Kastrau, Philipp; Leon-Ciliotta, Gianmarco
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Warwick; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：Does the allocation of incentives across the hierarchy of an organization matter for its performance? In an experiment with a large public health organization, we find that health care provision is highly affected by how incentives are allocated between frontline workers and their supervisors. Sharing incentives equally between these two layers raises health visits by 61% compared with unilateral allocations and uniquely improves health service provision and health outcomes. We provide reduced...
