作者：Topa, G
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I analyse a model that explicitly incorporates local interactions and allows agents to exchange information about job openings within their social networks. Agents are more likely to be employed if their social contacts are also employed. The model generates a stationary distribution of unemployment that exhibits positive spatial correlations. I estimate the model via an indirect inference procedure, using Census Tract data for Chicago. I find a significantly positive amount of social interact...
作者：Jehiel, P
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper considers discounted repeated games with boundedly rational players. In each period, player i chooses his current action on the basis of his forecast about the forthcoming n(i) action profiles; his assessment of the payoffs he will obtain next depends on his state of mind, which is non-deterministic. A limited forecast equilibrium is such that after every history the limited horizon forecasts formed by the players are correct. The set of all limited forecast equilibria is characteri...
