Limited foresight may force cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, P
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00173
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 369-391
• 关键词: repeated prisoners-dilemma; repeated games; Nash equilibrium; Finite automata; supergames; Forecast; play

摘要

This paper considers discounted repeated games with boundedly rational players. In each period, player i chooses his current action on the basis of his forecast about the forthcoming n(i) action profiles; his assessment of the payoffs he will obtain next depends on his state of mind, which is non-deterministic. A limited forecast equilibrium is such that after every history the limited horizon forecasts formed by the players are correct. The set of all limited forecast equilibria is characterized and constructed. Application to the repeated prisoner's dilemma shows that limited foresight may sometimes induce purely cooperative paths while purely non-cooperative paths cannot arise.