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作者：Topa, G
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I analyse a model that explicitly incorporates local interactions and allows agents to exchange information about job openings within their social networks. Agents are more likely to be employed if their social contacts are also employed. The model generates a stationary distribution of unemployment that exhibits positive spatial correlations. I estimate the model via an indirect inference procedure, using Census Tract data for Chicago. I find a significantly positive amount of social interact...
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作者：Kongsamut, P; Rebelo, S; Xie, DY
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University; Northwestern University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Balanced growth models are commonly used in macroeconomics because they are consistent with the well-known Kaldor facts regarding economic growth. These models, however, are inconsistent with one of the most striking regularities of the growth process-the massive reallocation of labour from agriculture into manufacturing and services. This paper presents a simple model consistent with both the Kaldor facts and the dynamics of sectoral labour reallocation.
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作者：Saez, E
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates. A simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the: top tail of the income distribution. In the general non-linear income tax problem, this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optima...
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作者：Bettzüge, MO; Hens, T
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：The purpose of this paper is to explain why some markets for financial products take off while others vanish as soon as they have emerged. To this end, we model an infinite sequence of CAPM-economies in which financial products can be used for insurance purposes. Agents' participation in these financial products, however, is restricted. Consecutive stage economies are linked by a mapping (transition function) which determines the next period's participation structure from the preceding period'...
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作者：Mailath, GJ; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine a market in which long-lived firms face a short-term incentive to exert low effort, but could earn higher profits if it were possible to commit to high effort. There are two types of firms, inept firms who can only exert low effort, and competent firms who have a choice between high and low effort. There is occasional exit, and competent and inept potential entrants compete for the right to inherit the departing firm's reputation. Consumers receive noisy signals of effort choice, an...
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作者：Kyriazidou, E
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper considers the problem of identification and estimation in panel data sample selection models with a binary selection rule, when the latent equations contain strictly exogenous variables, lags of the dependent variables, and unobserved individual effects. We derive a set of conditional moment restrictions which are then exploited to construct two-step GMM-type estimators for the parameters of the main equation. In the first step, the unknown parameters of the selection equation are c...
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作者：Lagunoff, R
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：Why would potentially intolerant majorities in a democracy protect the rights of unpopular groups? This paper models the formation of legal standards that determine the extent of civil liberty in a society. It is shown that tolerant legal standards emerge over time, despite all individuals having intolerant preferences. Each period citizens choose activities that have social consequences. A majority vote determines which of these activities are legally protected. Because of errors in interpret...
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作者：Jehiel, P
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper considers discounted repeated games with boundedly rational players. In each period, player i chooses his current action on the basis of his forecast about the forthcoming n(i) action profiles; his assessment of the payoffs he will obtain next depends on his state of mind, which is non-deterministic. A limited forecast equilibrium is such that after every history the limited horizon forecasts formed by the players are correct. The set of all limited forecast equilibria is characteri...
