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作者：Khan, A; King, RG; Wolman, AL
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Boston University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Optimal monetary policy maximizes the welfare of a representative agent, given frictions in the economic environment. Constructing a model with two sets of frictions-costly price adjustment by imperfectly competitive firms and costly exchange of wealth for goods-we find optimal monetary policy is governed by two familiar principles. First, the average level of the nominal interest rate should be sufficiently low, as suggested by Milton Friedman, that there should be deflation on average. Yet, ...
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作者：Albanesi, S; Chari, VV; Christiano, LJ
作者单位：Duke University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Northwestern University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Why is inflation persistently high in some periods and low in others? The reason may be the absence of commitment in monetary policy. In a standard model, absence of commitment leads to multiple equilibria, or expectation traps, even without trigger strategies. In these traps, expectations of high or low inflation lead the public to take defensive actions, which then make accommodating those expectations the optimal monetary policy. Under commitment, the equilibrium is unique and the inflation...
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作者：Benigno, G; Benigno, P
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; New York University
摘要：This paper studies the theoretical conditions under which price stability is the optimal policy in a two-country open-economy model with imperfect competition and price stickiness. Special conditions on the levels of country-specific distortionary taxation and the intratemporal and intertemporal elasticities of substitution need to be satisfied. These restrictions apply to both cooperative and non-cooperative settings. Importantly, we show that cooperative and non-cooperative solutions do not ...
