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作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Heidhues, Paul; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Riedel, Frank; Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; European School of Management & Technology; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; University of Bielefeld; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding preferences (ORPs). We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one's own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy. Given separability, it is impossible to identify ORPs from market behaviour: agents behave as if they had classical preferences that depend only on own consumption in competitive equilibrium...
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作者：Chernozhukov, Victor; Fernandez-Val, Ivan
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Boston University
摘要：Quantile regression (QR) is an increasingly important empirical tool in economics and other sciences for analysing the impact a set of regressors has on the conditional distribution of an outcome. Extremal QR, or QR applied to the tails, is of interest in many economic and financial applications, such as conditional value at risk, production efficiency, and adjustment bands in (S,s) models. This paper provides feasible inference tools for extremal conditional quantile models that rely on extre...
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作者：Ang, Andrew; Boivin, Jean; Dong, Sen; Loo-Kung, Rudy
作者单位：Columbia University; Bank of Canada; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We estimate the effect of shifts in monetary policy using the term structure of interest rates. In our no-arbitrage model, the short rate follows a version of the Taylor's (1993, Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195-214) rule where the coefficients on the output gap and inflation vary over time. The monetary policy loading on the output gap has averaged around 0 center dot 4 and has not changed very much over time. The overa...
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Camara, Odilon; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Southern California; University of Essex; University of Brescia
摘要：We develop a dynamic repeated election model in which citizen candidates are distinguished by both their ideology and valence. Voters observe an incumbent's valence and policy choices but only know the challenger's party. Our model provides a rich set of novel results. In contrast to existing predictions from static models, we prove that dynamic considerations make higher-valence incumbents more likely to compromise and win re-election, even though they compromise to more extreme policies. Con...
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作者：Duggan, J.; Martinelli, C.
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one-dimensional space perceived by voters. Economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory: expected electoral results influence economic choices, and economic choices in turn influence voting behaviour. In a two-candidate election, we show that media favouring the front-runner will focus on issues unlikely to deliver a surprise, while media favouring the...
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作者：Baliga, Sandeep; Lucca, David O.; Sjoestroem, Tomas
作者单位：Northwestern University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We build a game-theoretic model where aggression can be triggered by domestic political concerns as well as the fear of being attacked. In the model, leaders of full and limited democracies risk losing power if they do not stand up to threats from abroad. In addition, the leader of a fully democratic country loses the support of the median voter if he attacks a non-hostile country. The result is a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace. Using Polity data, we classify countries ...
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作者：Moen, Espen R.; Rosen, Asa
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; Stockholm University
摘要：This paper proposes a labour market model with job search frictions where workers have private information on match quality and effort. Firms use wage contracts to motivate workers. In addition, wages are also used to attract employees. We define and characterize competitive search equilibrium in this context, and show that it satisfies a simple modified Hosios rule. We also analyse the interplay between macroeconomic variables and optimal wage contracts. Finally, we show that private informat...
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作者：Taylor, Curtis R.; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：The incentive and project selection effects of agent anonymity are investigated in a setting where an evaluator observes a subjective signal of project quality. Although the evaluator cannot commit ex ante to an acceptance criterion, she decides up front between informed review, where the agent's ability is directly observable, or blind review, where it is not. An ideal acceptance criterion balances the goals of incentive provision and project selection. Relative to this, informed review resul...
