A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Duggan, J.; Martinelli, C.
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdq009
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 640-666
• 关键词: political competition; mass-media; news; ELECTIONS; MARKET; MODEL

摘要

We develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one-dimensional space perceived by voters. Economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory: expected electoral results influence economic choices, and economic choices in turn influence voting behaviour. In a two-candidate election, we show that media favouring the front-runner will focus on issues unlikely to deliver a surprise, while media favouring the underdog will gamble for resurrection. We characterize the socially optimal slant and show that it coincides with the one favoured by the underdog under a variety of circumstances. Balanced media, giving each issue equal coverage, may be worse for voters than partisan media.