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作者：Card, David; Devicienti, Francesco; Maida, Agata
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：Rent-sharing by workers can reduce the incentives for investment if some of the returns to sunk capital are captured in higher wages. We propose a simple measure of this holdup effect based on the size of the wage offset for firm-specific capital accumulation. Using Social Security earnings records for workers in the Veneto region of Italy linked to detailed financial data for their employers, we find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with an elasticity of wages with respect to potential rents ...
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作者：Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Brown University; University of Vienna
摘要：Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions (IS) or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, IS surprisingly oft...
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作者：Adhvaryu, Achyuta
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：I study how the misallocation of new technology to individuals, who have low ex post returns to its use, affects learning and adoption behaviour. I focus on anti-malarial treatment, which is frequently over-prescribed in many low-income country contexts where diagnostic tests are inaccessible. I show that misdiagnosis reduces average therapeutic effectiveness, because only a fraction of adopters actually have malaria, and slows the rate of social learning due to increased noise. I use data on ...
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作者：Kahn, Lisa B.; Lange, Fabian
作者单位：Yale University; McGill University
摘要：Pay distributions fan out with experience. The leading explanations for this pattern are that over time, either employers learn about worker productivity but productivity remains fixed or workers' productivities themselves evolve heterogeneously. We propose a dynamic specification that nests both employer learning and dynamic productivity heterogeneity. We estimate this model on a 20-year panel of pay and performance measures from a single, large firm. The advantage of these data is that they ...
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作者：Mertens, Karel R. S. M.; Ravn, Morten O.
作者单位：Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study the effects of fiscal policy interventions in a liquidity trap in a model with nominal rigidities and an interest rate rule. In a liquidity trap caused by a self-fulfilling state of low confidence, higher government spending has deflationary effects that reduce the spending multiplier when the zero lower bound is binding. Instead, cuts in marginal labour tax rates are inflationary and become more expansionary when the zero lower bound is binding. These findings contradict a popular vi...
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作者：Jullien, Bruno; Park, In-Uck
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Bristol; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：We show that sellers may earn a reputation for their ability to deliver high-quality goods on average by honestly announcing the realized quality of items for sale every period. As the expected revenue stream from continuing with honest communication increases with their ability, high-ability sellers remain honest while low-ability sellers find it too costly and sometimes lie about quality for short-term gain. Thus, cheap-talk communication facilitates the market's learning of a seller's abili...
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作者：Chade, Hector; Lewis, Gregory; Smith, Lones
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Harvard University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We develop a decentralized Bayesian model of college admissions with two ranked colleges, heterogeneous students, and two realistic match frictions: students find it costly to apply to college, and college evaluations of their applications are uncertain. Students thus face a portfolio choice problem in their application decision, while colleges choose admissions standards that act like market-clearing prices. Enrollment at each college is affected by the standards at the other college through ...
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作者：Chamley, Christophe
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：The mechanism by which aggregate supply creates the income that generates its matching demand (called Say's Law), may not work in a general equilibrium with decentralized markets and savings in bonds or money. Full employment is an equilibrium, but convergence to that state is slow. A self-fulfilling precautionary motive to accumulate bonds (with a zero aggregate supply) can set the economy on an equilibrium path with a fast convergence towards a steady state with unemployment that may be an a...
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作者：Eizenberg, Alon
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This article investigates the welfare implications of the rapid innovation in central processing units (CPUs), and asks whether it results in inefficient elimination of basic personal computer (PC) products. I analyse a game in which firms make multiple discrete product choices, and tackle challenges such as partial identification and sample selection. Estimation results demonstrate that the demand for PCs is highly segmented, and that fixed costs consume a substantial portion of the per-unit ...
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作者：Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Ok, Efe A.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; New York University
摘要：We use the revealed preference method to derive a model of individual decision making when the endowment of an agent provides a reference point that may influence her choices. This model generalizes the classical rational choice model, which views choice as a consequence of utility maximization. Instead, our model sees choice as arising from psychologically constrained utility maximization, where the constraints are induced by one's initial endowment. In particular, this model produces status ...
