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作者：Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter; Pycia, Marek; Rostek, Marzena; Weretka, Marek
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Auctions often involve the sale of many related goods: Treasury, spectrum, and electricity auctions are examples. In multi-unit auctions, bids for marginal units may affect payments for inframarginal units, giving rise to demand reduction and furthermore to incentives for shading bids differently across units. We establish that such differential bid shading results generically in ex post inefficient allocations in the uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions. We also show that, in general, the ef...
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作者：Reguant, Mar
摘要：I extend multi-unit auction estimation techniques to a setting in which firms can express cost complementarities over time. In the context of electricity markets, I show how the auction structure and bidding data can be used to estimate these complementarities, which in these markets arise due to startup costs. I find that startup costs are substantial and that taking them into account helps better explain firm bidding strategies and production patterns. As in other dynamic settings, I find th...
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作者：Kasy, Maximilian
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This article discusses identification in continuous triangular systems without restrictions on heterogeneity or functional form. We do not assume separability of structural functions, restrictions on the dimensionality of unobservables, or monotonicity in unobservables. We do maintain monotonicity of the first stage relationship in the instrument and consider the case of real-valued treatment. Under these conditions alone, and given rich enough support of the data, potential outcome distributi...
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作者：Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Troeger, Thomas
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Mannheim
摘要：We provide a solution to the informed-principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers. The principal's private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation. We show that there is no distortion: all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante, before he/she learns his/her type. As an application, we consider settings with linear utility. For bilateral exchange in which the princ...
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作者：Park, Yena
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This article studies optimal Ramsey taxation when risk sharing in private insurance markets is imperfect due to limited enforcement. In a limited commitment economy, there are externalities associated with capital and labour because individuals do not take into account that their labour and saving decisions affect aggregate labour and capital supply and wages, and thus the value of autarky. Therefore, a Ramsey government has an additional goal, which is to internalize these externalities of la...
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作者：Lewis, Gregory; Bajari, Patrick
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Deadlines and late penalties are widely used to incentivize effort. Tighter deadlines and higher penalties induce higher effort, but increase the agent's risk. We model how these contract terms affect the work rate and time-to-completion in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on Minnesota highway construction contracts that includes day-by-day information on work plans, hours worked and delays, we find evidence of ex post moral hazard...
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作者：Anderson, Michael L.; Auffhammer, Maximilian
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Heavier vehicles are safer for their own occupants but more hazardous for other vehicles. Simple theory thus suggests that an unregulated vehicle fleet is inefficiently heavy. Using three separate identification strategies we show that, controlling for own-vehicle weight, being hit by a vehicle that is 1000 pounds heavier generates a 40-50% increase in fatality risk. These results imply a total accident-related externality that exceeds the estimated social cost of US carbon emissions and is eq...
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作者：Belloni, Alexandre; Chernozhukov, Victor; Hansen, Christian
作者单位：Duke University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago
摘要：We propose robust methods for inference about the effect of a treatment variable on a scalar outcome in the presence of very many regressors in a model with possibly non-Gaussian and heteroscedastic disturbances. We allow for the number of regressors to be larger than the sample size. To make informative inference feasible, we require the model to be approximately sparse; that is, we require that the effect of confounding factors can be controlled for up to a small approximation error by inclu...
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作者：Del Boca, Daniela; Flinn, Christopher; Wiswall, Matthew
作者单位：Collegio Carlo Alberto; New York University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：The growth in labour market participation among women with young children has raised concerns about its implications for child cognitive development. We estimate a model of the cognitive development process of children nested within an otherwise standard model of household behaviour. The household makes labour supply decisions and provides time and money inputs into the child quality production process during the development period. Our empirical results indicate that both parents' time inputs...
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作者：Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet
作者单位：Koc University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This article considers a two-sided search market where firms and workers are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for the agents. The market includes inflexible commitment types who demand a constant portion of any match surplus. The frequency of such types is determined in equilibrium.An equilibrium where there are significant delays in reaching an agreement and where negotiations occasionally break down on the equilibrium path is c...
