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作者：Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This article analyses contractual situations between many principals and many agents. The agents have private information, and the principals take actions. Principals have the ability to contract not only on the reports of the agents but also on the contracts offered by other principals. Contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. The main result of the article is a characterization of the allocations that can be implemented as equilibria in our contracting game. We then r...
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作者：Bloom, Nicholas; Propper, Carol; Seiler, Stephan; Van Reenen, John
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Imperial College London; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyse the causal impact of competition on managerial quality and hospital performance. To address the endogeneity of market structure we analyse the English public hospital sector where entry and exit are controlled by the central government. Because closing hospitals in areas where the governing party is expecting a tight election race (marginals) is rare due to the fear of electoral defeat, we can use political marginality as an instrumental variable for the number of hospitals in a geo...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Jackson, Matthew O.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：We study the evolution of a social norm of cooperation in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behaviour that are stable in part due to agents' interpretations of private information about the past, influenced by occasional commonly observed past behaviours. For sufficiently backward-looking societies, history completely drives equilibrium play, leadin...
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作者：Rhodes, Andrew
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study the pricing behaviour of a multiproduct firm, when consumers must pay a search cost to learn its prices. Equilibrium prices are high, because consumers understand that visiting a store exposes them to a hold-up problem. However, a firm with more products charges lower prices, because it attracts consumers who are more price sensitive. Similarly, when a firm advertises a low price on one product, consumers rationally expect it to charge somewhat lower prices on its other products as we...
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作者：Bordon, Paola; Fu, Chao
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Many countries use college-major-specific admissions policies that require a student to choose a college-major pair jointly. Given the potential of student-major mismatches, we explore the equilibrium effects of postponing student choice of major. We develop a sorting equilibrium model under the college-major-specific admissions regime, allowing for match uncertainty and peer effects. We estimate the model using Chilean data. We introduce the counterfactual regime as a Stackelberg game in whic...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：When is it best for the Principal to commit to not disclosing all that he/she knows in moral hazard interactions? I show that whenever the Agent would choose the same action under complete information at several distinct states, then full transparency can generically be improved upon. This implies that full transparency is generically suboptimal whenever the dimension of the information held by the Principal exceeds the dimension of the Agent's action. In a simple class of problems, I make fur...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model. This captures the presence of consumer withdrawal rights as, for instance, mandated by European Union regulation of distance sales contracts. With such additional constraints, the optimal contract is static and, unlike with only ex ante participation constraints, does not elicit the agent's information sequentially. This holds whenever differences in ex ante and ex post outside options are below a positi...
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作者：Fisman, Raymond; Wang, Yongxiang
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Southern California
摘要：We study the relationship between the political connections of Chinese firms and workplace fatalities. In our preferred specification, we find that the worker death rate for connected companies is two to three times that of unconnected firms (depending on the sample employed), a pattern that holds for within-firm estimations. The connections-mortality relationship is attenuated in provinces where safety regulators' promotion is contingent on meeting safety targets. In the absence of fatalities...
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作者：Breon-Drish, Bradyn
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I study a general class of noisy rational expectations models that nests the standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980) models, but relaxes the usual assumption of joint normality of asset pay-offs and supply, and allows for more general signal structures. I provide a constructive proof of existence of equilibrium, characterize the price function, and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness within the class of equilibria with continuous price functions, which are met by both...
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作者：Dhaene, Geert; Jochmans, Koen
作者单位：KU Leuven; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：Maximum-likelihood estimation of nonlinear models with fixed effects is subject to the incidental-parameter problem. This typically implies that point estimates suffer from large bias and confidence intervals have poor coverage. This article presents a jackknife method to reduce this bias and to obtain confidence intervals that are correctly centred under rectangular-array asymptotics. The method is explicitly designed to handle dynamics in the data, and yields estimators that are straightforw...
