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作者：Fuchs, William; Garicano, Luis; Rayo, Luis
作者单位：IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge-intensive economy in which agents endogenously specialize in either production or consulting. The resulting market for advice is plagued by informational problems, since both the difficulty of the questions posed to consultants and the knowledge of those consultants are hard to assess. We show that spot contracting is not efficient because lemons (in this case, self-employed producers with intermediate knowl...
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作者：Gandhi, Amit; Serrano-Padial, Ricardo
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This article studies belief heterogeneity in a benchmark competitive asset market: a market for Arrow-Debreu securities. We show that differences in agents' beliefs lead to a systematic pricing pattern, the favourite-longshot bias (FLB): securities with a low-pay-out probability are overpriced, whereas securities with high probability pay-out are underpriced. We apply demand estimation techniques to betting market data, and find that the observed FLB is explained by a two-type population consi...
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作者：Carapella, Francesca; Williamson, Stephen
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Washington University (WUSTL); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：Adynamic model with credit under limited commitment is constructed, in which limited memory can weaken the effects of punishment for default. This creates an endogenous role for government debt in credit markets, and the economy can be non-Ricardian. Default can occur in equilibrium, and government debt essentially plays a role as collateral and thus improves borrowers' incentives. The provision of government debt acts to discourage default, whether default occurs in equilibrium or not.
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作者：Embrey, Matthew; Frechette, Guillaume R.; Lehrer, Steven F.
作者单位：Maastricht University; New York University; Queens University - Canada; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are obstinate in their demands, creates incentives for all players to build reputations for being hard bargainers. The data are qualitatively consistent with the theory, as subjects mimic induced types. Furthermore, we find evidence for the presence of com...
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作者：Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M.
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Bayreuth; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Munich
摘要：We propose a theory of inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and losses of the renegotiated transaction. We show that loss aversion makes the renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long-term contr...
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作者：Simonovska, Ina
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：I study the positive relationship between prices of tradable goods and per capita income. I develop a highly tractable general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms and non-homothetic consumer preferences that positively links prices of tradables to consumer income. Guided by the model's testable prediction, I estimate the elasticity of price with respect to per capita income from a unique data set that I construct, which features prices of 245 identical goods sold ...
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作者：Hackbarth, Dirk; Johnson, Timothy
作者单位：Boston University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We examine the asset pricing implications of a neoclassical model of repeated investment and disinvestment. Prior research has emphasized a negative relation between productivity and equity risk that results from operating leverage when capital adjustment is costly. In general, however, expansion and contraction options affect risk in the opposite direction: they lower equity risk as profitability declines. The general prediction is a non-monotonic overlay of opposing real option and operating...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This article studies an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of...
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作者：Bruno, Valentina; Shin, Hyun Song
作者单位：American University; Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
摘要：We investigate global factors associated with bank capital flows. We formulate a model of the international banking system where global banks interact with local banks. The solution highlights the bank leverage cycle as the determinant of the transmission of financial conditions across borders through banking sector capital flows. A distinctive prediction of the model is that local currency appreciation is associated with higher leverage of the banking sector, thereby providing a conceptual br...
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作者：Cho, In-Koo; Kasa, Kenneth
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; Hanyang University; Simon Fraser University
摘要：This paper studies adaptive learning with multiple models. An agent operating in a self-referential environment is aware of potential model misspecification, and tries to detect it, in real-time, using an econometric specification test. If the current model passes the test, it is used to construct an optimal policy. If it fails the test, a new model is selected. As the rate of coefficient updating decreases, one model becomes dominant, and is used almost always. Dominant models can be characte...
