The Mortality Cost of Political Connections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fisman, Raymond; Wang, Yongxiang
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdv020
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1346-1382
• 关键词: corruption; firm; performance; CHINA; turnover; boards

摘要

We study the relationship between the political connections of Chinese firms and workplace fatalities. In our preferred specification, we find that the worker death rate for connected companies is two to three times that of unconnected firms (depending on the sample employed), a pattern that holds for within-firm estimations. The connections-mortality relationship is attenuated in provinces where safety regulators' promotion is contingent on meeting safety targets. In the absence of fatalities, connected firms receive fewer reports of major violations for safety compliance, whereas in years of fatal accidents the rate of reported violations is identical. Moreover, fatal accidents produce negative returns at connected companies and are associated with the subsequent departure of well-connected executives. These results provide suggestive evidence that connections enable firms to avoid (potentially costly) compliance measures, rather than using connections to avoid regulatory response after accidents occur. Our findings emphasize the social costs of political connections, and suggest that appropriate regulatory incentives may be useful in mitigating these costs.