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作者：Allain, Marie-Laure; Chambolle, Claire; Rey, Patrick
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; INRAE; Universite Paris Saclay; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：While vertical integration is traditionally seen as a solution to the hold-up problem, this article highlights instead that it can generate hold-up problems-for rivals. We consider a successive duopoly where downstream firms invest and then secure support from an upstream supplier. We first show that vertical integration generates ex ante incentives to create hold-up problems: an integrated supplier is willing to pre-commit itself to appropriating or dissipating part of its customer's profits,...
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作者：Jakiela, Pamela; Ozier, Owen
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; The World Bank
摘要：This article measures the economic impacts of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbours in rural Kenyan villages. We conduct a lab experiment in which we randomly vary the observability of investment returns to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden. We find that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment, though that strategy reduces their expected earnings. This effect is largest among wom...
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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.; Galeotti, Andrea
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University; University of Essex
摘要：The increase in the information that firms can collect or purchase about network effects across consumers motivates two important questions: how does a firm's pricing strategy react to detailed information on network effects? Are the availability and use of such information beneficial or detrimental to consumer surplus? We develop a model in which a monopoly sells a network good and price discriminates based on information about consumers' influence and consumers' susceptibility to influence. ...
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作者：Wong, Tsz-Nga
作者单位：Bank of Canada
摘要：This article studies an economy with both centralized and decentralized monetary exchanges under search frictions. A degenerate asset distribution is featured under a broad class of preferences including, for example, constant return to scale, constant elasticity of substitution, CARA and others from a range of macroeconomic literatures. Some novel applications impossible under quasi-linear preferences, for example endogenous growth, are illustrated under this class of preferences. This articl...
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作者：Vogl, Tom S.
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Using micro-data from 48 developing countries, this article studies changes in cross-sectional patterns of fertility and child investment over the demographic transition. Before 1960, children from larger families obtained more education, in large part because they had richer and more educated parents. By century's end, these patterns had reversed. Consequently, fertility differentials by income and education historically raised the average education of the next generation, but they now reduce...
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作者：Menzel, Konrad
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We develop an asymptotic theory for static discrete-action games with a large number of players, and propose a novel inference approach based on stochastic expansions around the limit of the finite-player game. Our analysis focuses on anonymous games in which payoffs are a function of the agent's own action and the empirical distribution of her opponents' play. We establish a law of large numbers and central limit theorem which can be used to establish consistency of point or set estimators an...
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作者：Armstrong, Mark; Zhou, Jidong
作者单位：University of Oxford; Yale University
摘要：We study sales techniques which discourage consumer search by making it harder or more expensive to return to buy after a search for alternatives. It is unilaterally profitable for a seller to deter search under mild conditions, but sellers can suffer when all do so. When a seller cannot commit to its policy, it exploits the inference that those consumers who try to buy later have no good alternative, and in many cases the outcome is as if the seller must make an exploding offer. Search deterr...
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作者：Kang, Karam
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：In this article, I quantify the extent to which lobbying expenditures by firms affect policy enactment. To achieve this end, I construct a novel dataset containing all federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th Congress. I then develop and estimate a game-theoretic model where heterogeneous players choose lobbying expenditures to affect the probability that a policy is enacted. I find that the effect of lobbying expenditures on a policy's equilibri...
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作者：Hopenhayn, Hugo A.; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Warwick
摘要：This article studies optimal patents with respect to the timing of innovation disclosure. In a simple model, we identify forces that lead firms to either suboptimally patent too early or too late in equilibrium, and we determine conditions so that stronger patents induce earlier or later equilibrium disclosure. Then, by solving an infinite multistage patent game with a more explicit structure, we describe innovation growth, and derive detailed predictions that can be used for policy experiment...
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作者：Delavande, Adeline; Kohler, Hans-Peter
作者单位：University of Essex; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We use probabilistic expectations data elicited from survey respondents in rural Malawi to investigate how risky sexual behaviour may be influenced by individuals' expectations about survival, and future HIV status, which in turn depend on the perceived impact of HIV/AIDS on survival, expectations about own and partner's current HIV status, and expectations about HIV transmission rates. Subjective expectations, in particular about mortality risk but not the risk of living with HIV, play an imp...
