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作者：Ritzberger, Klaus
摘要：This article studies a market game under uncertainty in which agents may submit multiple limit and market orders. When agents know their preferences at all states, the competitive equilibrium can be supported as a Nash equilibrium of the market game, that is, agents behave as if they were price takers. Therefore, if the associated competitive economy has a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, then so does the market game. This resolves the puzzle that agents behave as if prices w...
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作者：Bloom, Nicholas; Draca, Mirko; Van Reenen, John
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Warwick; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We examine the impact of Chinese import competition on broad measures of technical change-patenting, IT, and TFP-using new panel data across twelve European countries from 1996 to 2007. In particular, we establish that the absolute volume of innovation increases within the firms most affected by Chinese imports in their output markets. We correct for endogeneity using the removal of product-specific quotas following China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. Chinese import compet...
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作者：Augenblick, Ned
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This article theoretically and empirically analyses behaviour in penny auctions, a relatively new auction mechanism. As in the US dollars or war-of-attrition, players in penny auctions commit higher non-refundable costs as the auction continues and only win if all other players stop bidding. I first show that, in any equilibria that does not end immediately, players bid probabilistically such that the expected profit from every bid is zero. Then, using two large data sets covering 166,000 auct...
