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作者：Halac, Marina; Kartik, Navin; Liu, Qingmin
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Warwick
摘要：This paper studies a model of long-term contracting for experimentation. We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection on the agent's ability, dynamic moral hazard, and private learning about project quality. We find that each of these elements plays an essential role in structuring dynamic incentives, and it is only their interaction that generally precludes efficiency. Our model permits an explicit characterization of optimal contracts.
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作者：Rendahl, Pontus
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：This article shows that equilibrium unemployment dynamics can significantly increase the efficacy of fiscal policy. In response to a shock that brings the economy into a liquidity trap, an expansion in government spending increases output and causes a fall in the unemployment rate. Since movements in unemployment are persistent, the effects of current spending prevail into the future, leading to an enduring rise in income. As an enduring rise in income boosts private demand, an increase in gov...
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作者：Meng, Xin; Qian, Nancy; Yared, Pierre
作者单位：Australian National University; Yale University; Columbia University
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作者：Storeygard, Adam
作者单位：Tufts University
摘要：This article investigates the role of intercity transport costs in determining the income of sub-Saharan African cities. In particular, focusing on fifteen countries whose largest city is a port, I find that an oil price increase of the magnitude experienced between 2002 and 2008 induces the income of cities near that port to increase by 7% relative to otherwise identical cities 500 km farther away. Combined with external estimates, this implies an elasticity of city economic activity with res...
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作者：Chiu, Jonathan; Koeppl, Thorsten V.
作者单位：Bank of Canada; Victoria University Wellington; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We study trading dynamics in an asset market where the quality of assets is private information and finding a counterparty takes time. When trading ceases in equilibrium as a response to an adverse shock to asset quality, a government can resurrect trading by buying up lemons which involves a financial loss. The optimal policy is centred around an announcement effect where trading starts already before the intervention for two reasons. First, delaying the intervention allows selling pressure t...
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作者：Nurski, Laura; Verboven, Frank
作者单位：KU Leuven; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the European car market. We first estimate a demand model with product and spatial differentiation, and quantify consumers' valuations for dealer proximity and dealer exclusivity. We then perform policy counterfactuals to assess the profit incentives and ...
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作者：Rothschild, Casey; Scheuer, Florian
作者单位：Wellesley College; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or because they reduce the returns to traditional work. We characterize Pareto optimal income taxes that do not condition on how much of an individual's income is earned in each of the two activities. These...
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作者：Erosa, Andres; Fuster, Luisa; Kambourov, Gueorgui
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Toronto
摘要：We build a heterogeneous agents life cycle model that captures a large number of salient features of individual male labour supply over the life cycle, by education, both along the intensive and extensive margins. The model provides an aggregation theory of individual labour supply, firmly grounded on individual-level micro-evidence, and is used to study the aggregate labour supply responses to changes in the economic environment. We find that the aggregate labour supply elasticity to a transi...
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作者：Arcidiacono, Peter; Bayer, Patrick; Blevins, Jason R.; Ellickson, Paul B.
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Rochester
摘要：This article develops a dynamic model of retail competition and uses it to study the impact of the expansion of a new national competitor on the structure of urban markets. In order to accommodate substantial heterogeneity (both observed and unobserved) across agents and markets, the article first develops a general framework for estimating and solving dynamic discrete choice models in continuous time that is computationally light and readily applicable to dynamic games. In the proposed framew...
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作者：Beath, Andrew; Christia, Fotini; Egorov, Georgy; Enikolopov, Ruben
作者单位：The World Bank; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Barcelona School of Economics; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; New Economic School
摘要：Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This article explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes. We show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent ca...
