Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Beath, Andrew; Christia, Fotini; Egorov, Georgy; Enikolopov, Ruben
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Barcelona School of Economics; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; New Economic School
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw018
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 932-968
• 关键词: public-goods; CORRUPTION; systems; MODEL; equilibrium; COMPETITION; ACCOUNTABILITY; institutions; incentives; competence

摘要

Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This article explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes. We show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives selected by elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.