Optimal Contracts for Experimentation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Halac, Marina; Kartik, Navin; Liu, Qingmin
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw013
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1040-1091
• 关键词: Dynamic contracts; moral hazard; TECHNOLOGY; extraction; adoption; surplus

摘要

This paper studies a model of long-term contracting for experimentation. We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection on the agent's ability, dynamic moral hazard, and private learning about project quality. We find that each of these elements plays an essential role in structuring dynamic incentives, and it is only their interaction that generally precludes efficiency. Our model permits an explicit characterization of optimal contracts.