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作者：Kurlat, Pablo; Scheuer, Florian
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Zurich
摘要：We study competitive equilibria in a signalling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers. In terms of the classic Spence (1973, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355-374) model of job market signalling, firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types, in addition to observing their education. Firms can be ranked according to the quality of their information, i.e., their expertise. In equilibrium, some high-type workers forgo signalling and are hired by better...
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作者：Guren, Adam M.; McKay, Alisdair; Nakamura, Emi; Steinsson, Jon
作者单位：Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We provide new time-varying estimates of the housing wealth effect back to the 1980s. We use three identification strategies: ordinary least squares with a rich set of controls, the Saiz housing supply elasticity instrument, and a new instrument that exploits systematic differences in city-level exposure to regional house price cycles. All three identification strategies indicate that housing wealth elasticities were if anything slightly smaller in the 2000s than in earlier time periods. This ...
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作者：Qu, Zhongjun; Zhuo, Fan
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：Markov regime-switching models are very common in economics and finance. Despite persisting interest in them, the asymptotic distributions of likelihood ratio-based tests for detecting regime switching remain unknown. This study examines such tests and establishes their asymptotic distributions in the context of nonlinear models, allowing multiple parameters to be affected by regime switching. The analysis addresses three difficulties: (i) some nuisance parameters are unidentified under the nu...
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作者：Andreyanov, Pasha; Sadzik, Tomasz
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In this article, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show...
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作者：Heldring, Leander
作者单位：University of Bonn; Tilburg University
摘要：This article shows that the intensity of violence in Rwanda's recent past can be traced back to the initial establishment of its pre-colonial state. Villages that were brought under centralized rule one century earlier experienced a doubling of violence during the state-organized 1994 genocide. Instrumental variable estimates exploiting differences in the proximity to Nyanza-an early capital-suggest that these effects are causal. Before the genocide, when the state faced rebel attacks, with lo...
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Johnen, Johannes; Koszegi, Botond
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Central European University
摘要：We identify a competition-policy-based argument for regulating the secondary features of complex or complexly priced products when consumers have limited attention. Limited attention implies that consumers can only study a small number of complex products in full, while-by failing to check secondary features-they can superficially browse more. Interventions limiting ex post consumer harm through safety regulations, caps on certain fees, or other methods induce consumers to do more or more mean...
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作者：Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie; Uribe, Martin
作者单位：Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article establishes the existence of multiple equilibria in infinite-horizon open economy models in which the value of tradable and non-tradable endowments serves as collateral. In this environment, the economy displays self-fulfilling financial crises in which pessimistic views about the value of collateral induce agents to deleverage. Under plausible calibrations, there exist equilibria with underborrowing. This result stands in contrast to the overborrowing result stressed in the relat...
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作者：Dhyne, Emmanuel; Kikkawa, Ayumu Ken; Mogstad, Magne; Tintelnot, Felix
作者单位：European Central Bank; National Bank of Belgium; University of British Columbia; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine how many and what kind of firms ultimately rely on foreign inputs, sell to foreign markets, and are affected by trade shocks. To capture that firms can trade indirectly by buying from or selling to domestic firms that import or export, we use Belgian data with information on both domestic firm-to-firm sales and foreign trade transactions. We find that most firms use a lot of foreign inputs, but only a small number of firms show that dependence through direct imports. While direct ex...
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作者：Iverson, Terrence; Karp, Larry
作者单位：Colorado State University System; Colorado State University Fort Collins; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the Markov perfect equilibrium in a dynamic game where agents have non-constant time preference, decentralized households determine aggregate savings, and a planner chooses climate policy. The article is the first to solve this problem with general discounting and general functional forms. With time-inconsistent preferences, a commitment device that allows a planner to choose climate policy for multiple periods is potentially very valuable. Nevertheless, our quantitative results show ...
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作者：Mueller-Smith, Michael; Schnepel, Kevin T.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Simon Fraser University
摘要：This article provides the first causal estimates on the popular, cost-saving practice of diversion in the criminal justice system, an intervention that provides offenders with a second chance to avoid a criminal record. We exploit two natural experiments in Harris County, Texas where first-time felony defendants faced abrupt changes in the probability of diversion. Using administrative data and regression discontinuity methods, we find robust evidence across both experiments that diversion cut...
