-
作者：Battiston, Diego; Vidal, Jordi Blanes, I; Kirchmaier, Tom
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：Communication is integral to organizations and yet field evidence on the relation between communication and worker productivity remains scarce. We argue that a core role of communication is to transmit information that helps co-workers do their job better. We build a simple model in which workers choose the amount of communication by trading off this benefit against the time cost incurred by the sender, and use it to derive a set of empirical predictions. We then exploit a natural experiment i...
-
作者：Catonini, Emiliano
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：In dynamic games, players may observe a deviation from a pre-play, possibly incomplete, non-binding agreement before the game is over. The attempt to rationalize the deviation may lead players to revise their beliefs about the deviator's behaviour in the continuation of the game. This instance of forward induction reasoning is based on interactive beliefs about not just rationality, but also the compliance with the agreement itself. I study the effects of such rationalization on the self-enfor...
-
作者：Larsen, Bradley J.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This study empirically quantifies the efficiency of a real-world bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987) derived the theoretical ex-ante efficient frontier for bilateral trade under two-sided uncertainty and demonstrated that it falls short of ex-post efficiency, but little is known about how well bargaining performs in practice. Using about 265,000 sequences of a game of alternating-offer bargaining following an ascending auc...
-
作者：Tan, Guofu; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：University of Southern California; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study price competition and entry of platforms in multi-sided markets. Utilizing the simplicity of the equilibrium pricing formula in our setting with heterogeneity of customers' membership benefits, we demonstrate that in the presence of externalities, the standard effects of competition can be reversed: as platform competition increases, prices, and platform profits can go up and consumer surplus can go down. We identify economic forces that jointly determine the social inefficiency of th...
