Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andreyanov, Pasha; Sadzik, Tomasz
• 署名单位: HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa049
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 521-573
• 关键词: Double auction; private information; simple market; implementation; EFFICIENCY; INEFFICIENCY; aggregation; equilibria; economies; EXISTENCE

摘要

In this article, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.