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作者:Shrinivas, Aditya; Baylis, Kathy; Crost, Benjamin
作者单位:Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Calgary
摘要:biggest expansions in food transfers in history, affecting over 500 million people. We use plausibly exogenous variation created by the NFSA to estimate the effect of food transfers on child nutrition. Using individual panel data across eight states in India over five years, we find that increased transfers significantly reduced stunting. The food transfers increased wage incomes and improved dietary diversity. Our results suggest that, in the states we study, the NFSA prevented approximately ...
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作者:Johnston, Andrew C.
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Merced
摘要:I examine teacher preferences using a discrete-choice experiment linked to data on teacher effectiveness. I estimate willingness to pay for a rich set of compensation elements and working conditions. Highly effective teachers usually have the same preferences as their peers, but they have stronger preferences for performance pay. I use the preference estimates to investigate the optimal compensation structure for three key objectives: maximizing teacher utility, maximizing teacher retention, a...
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作者:Mattsson, Martin
作者单位:National University of Singapore
摘要:Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low-and middle-income countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11 percent but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scor...
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作者:Agan, Amanda Y.; Cowgill, Bo; Gee, Laura K.
作者单位:Cornell University; Columbia University; Tufts University
摘要:We study how salary disclosures affect employer demand using afield experiment featuring hundreds of recruiters evaluating over 2,000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary questions and the candidates'disclosures for male and female applicants. Our findings suggest that extra dollars disclosed yield higher salary offers, willingness to pay, and perceptions of outside options by recruiters (all similarly for men and women). Recruiters make negative inferences about the quality a...