-
作者:Layton, Timothy J.; Maestas, Nicole; Prinz, Daniel; Vabson, Boris
作者单位:Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; The World Bank; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要:We study two mechanisms used by public health insurance programs for rationing health care: outsourcing to private managed care plans and quantity limits for prescription drugs. Leveraging a natural experiment in Texas's Medicaid program, we find that the shift to managed care and the relaxation of a strict drug cap increased access to high-value drugs and outpatient services and reduced avoidable hospitalizations. Program costs increased significantly, indicating a trade-off between cost and ...
-
作者:Rossi, Pauline; Godard, Mathilde
作者单位:Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要:The old-age security motive for fertility postulates that people's needs for old-age support raise the demand for children. We exploit the extension of social pensions in Namibia during the 1990s to pro-vide a quasi-experimental quantification of this widespread idea. The reform eliminated inequalities in pension coverage and ben-efits across regions and ethnic groups. Combining differences in pre-reform pensions and differences in exposure across cohorts, we show that pensions substantially r...
-
作者:Gershenson, Seth; Hart, Cassandra M. D.; Hyman, Joshua; Lindsay, Constance A.; Papageorge, Nicholas W.
作者单位:American University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Davis; Amherst College; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:Leveraging the Tennessee STAR class size experiment, we show that Black students randomly assigned to at least one Black teacher in grades K-3 are 9 percentage points (13 percent) more likely to graduate from high school and 6 percentage points (19 percent) more likely to enroll in college compared to their Black schoolmates who are not. Black teachers have no significant long-run effects on White students. Postsecondary education results are driven by two-year colleges and concentrated among ...
-
作者:Myers, Erica; Puller, Steven L.; West, Jeremy
作者单位:University of Calgary; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要:Mandatory disclosure policies are implemented broadly despite sparse evidence that they improve market outcomes. We study the effects of requiring home sellers to provide buyers with certified audits of residential energy efficiency. Using similar nearby homes as a comparison group, we find that this requirement increases price premiums for energy efficiency and encourages energy-saving investments. We additionally present evidence highlighting the mar-ket failure-incomplete information by bot...
-
作者:Bond, Timothy N.; Carr, Jillian B.; Packham, Analisa; Smith, Jonathan
作者单位:Purdue University System; Purdue University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Vanderbilt University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要:Monthly government transfer programs create cycles of consump-tion that track the timing of benefit receipt. If these cycles corre-spond to critical moments for student learning and achievement, the timing of transfers may have important long-run implications for low-income students. In this paper we exploit state-level variation in the staggered timing of nutritional assistance benefit issuance to analyze effects on academic achievement. Using individual-level data from a large national colle...
-
作者:Sabouni, Hisam; Shelton, Cameron A.
作者单位:Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont Colleges; Claremont McKenna College; Claremont Graduate University
摘要:Theories of partisan redistricting postulate unitary actors maximiz-ing their party's expected seat share. Yet, the partition of a fixed sup-ply of friendly voters necessarily implies a tragedy of the commons. We recast partisan redistricting as a bargaining game among the sitting representatives of the party controlling the map. The status quo is the threat point, explaining why changes are frequently minor. This bargaining framework implies that highly competitive districts will receive more...