Gerrymandering in State Legislatures: Frictions from Axiomatic Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sabouni, Hisam; Shelton, Cameron A.
• 署名单位: Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont Colleges; Claremont McKenna College; Claremont Graduate University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190213
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 519-542
• 关键词: electoral bias

摘要

Theories of partisan redistricting postulate unitary actors maximiz-ing their party's expected seat share. Yet, the partition of a fixed sup-ply of friendly voters necessarily implies a tragedy of the commons. We recast partisan redistricting as a bargaining game among the sitting representatives of the party controlling the map. The status quo is the threat point, explaining why changes are frequently minor. This bargaining framework implies that highly competitive districts will receive more help from redistricting if they are already repre-sented by the party in charge. Employing a regression discontinuity design with precinct-level data, we find support for this prediction.