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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In this paper we analyze the coevolution of segregation into private and state schools, beliefs about the educational merits of different schools, and labor market discrimination. In a dynamic model, we characterize a necessary and sufficient condition on initial levels of segregation and beliefs under which full polarization of beliefs and long-run labor market discrimination are sustainable. The model suggests a new perspective on the long-term effects of different policy interventions, such...
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作者：Chen, Cheng
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：I incorporate a monitoring-based firm hierarchy into an industry equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. I then use the theory to study aggregate impacts of an economy-wide improvement in monitoring efficiency. This shock generates a selection effect, which favors more hierarchical (i.e., more layers) firms. Interestingly, these implications depend on firms' heterogeneous choices about their hierarchy and completely disappear when firms are homogeneous in terms of the number of layers insi...
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作者：Plott, Charles R.; Pogorelskiy, Kirill
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Warwick
摘要：We study multiple-unit, laboratory experimental call markets in which orders are cleared by a single price at a scheduled call. The markets are independent trading days with two calls each day preceded by a continuous and public order flow. Markets approach the competitive equilibrium over time. The price formation dynamics operate through the flow of bids and asks configured as the jaws of the order book with contract execution featuring elements of an underlying mathematical principle, the N...
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作者：McMurray, Joseph
作者单位：Brigham Young University
摘要：Spatial election literature attributes voters' political differences to irreconcilable conflicts of interest. Alternatively, voters may merely hold differing beliefs regarding which policies best promote the public interest, as in the classic common-value model of Condorcet (1785). This paper shows how a spatial version of the common-value model explains empirical patterns of public opinion, ideology, electoral margins, and participation that are puzzling from the standard perspective, suggest...
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作者：Lima, Rafael Costa; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry
作者单位：Universidade Federal de Pernambuco; Getulio Vargas Foundation; Paris School of Economics; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro
摘要：We address the trade- off between centralized and decentralized decision making subject to influence from privately informed lobbies. We focus on informative equilibria with separating differentiable contribution schedules and identify an information transmission effect under centralized structures. Such effect decreases capture and increases welfare when lobbies have aligned preferences. The opposite effect holds for polarized preferences. We present two examples of this framework: local publ...
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作者：Belloc, Marianna; Bowles, Samuel
作者单位：Sapienza University Rome; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：Differences among nations in culture (preferences including social norms) and institutions (contracts) may result in specialization and gains from trade even in the absence of exogenous differences in factor endowments or technologies. Goods differ in the kinds of contracts that are appropriate for their production, and so strategic complementarities between contracts and social norms may result in a multiplicity of cultural-institutional equilibria. The resulting country differences in cultur...
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作者：Pablo Arribillaga, R.; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the -set-inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation to be as manipulabl...
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作者：Hellmann, Thomas; Thiele, Veikko
作者单位：University of Oxford; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We develop a new theory of the dynamic boundary of the firm where asset owners may want to change partners ex post. We identify a fundamental trade-off between (i) a displacement externality under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though his benefit is worth less than the loss to the displaced partner, and (ii) a retention externality under integration, where a partner inefficiently retains the other. With more asset specificity, displacement externalities matter more...
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作者：Kawakami, Kei
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：We analyze the welfare implications of information aggregation in a trading model where traders have both idiosyncratic endowment risk and asymmetric information about security payoffs. The optimal market size balances two forces: (i) the risk-sharing role of markets, which creates a positive externality amongst traders, against (ii) the information-aggregation role of prices, which leads to prices that are more correlated with security payoffs, thereby undermining the hedging function of mark...
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作者：Beshkar, Mostafa; Bond, Eric W.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We propose a model of flexible trade agreements in which verifying the prevailing contingencies is possible but costly. Two types of flexibility emerge: contingent protection, which requires governments to verify the state of the world, and discretionary protection, which allows governments to set tariffs unilaterally. The structure of the GATT/WTO agreement provides these two types of flexibility through a mechanism that we call Cap and Escape. Governments may choose tariffs unilaterally belo...
