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作者：Cisternas, Ionlalo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I examine how career concerns are shaped by the nature of productive actions taken by workers. A worker's skills follow a Gaussian process with an endogenous component reflecting human-capital accumulation. Effort and skills are substitutes both in the output process (as in Holmstrom 1999) and in the skills technology. The focus is on deterministic equilibria by virtue of Gaussian learning. When effort and skills are direct inputs to production and skills are exogenous, effort can be inefficie...
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作者：Karni, Edi
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This paper describes a direct revelation mechanism for eliciting decision makers' introspective beliefs on sets of subjective prior or posterior probabilities. The proposed scheme constitutes a revealed-preference procedure for measuring the inclination of decision makers to choose one alternative over another modeled by Minardi and Savochkin (2015).
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作者：Osborne, Matthew
作者单位：University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga
摘要：This paper estimates a cost-of-living index using a dynamic structural model for two storable product categories. In each category, regime shifts to higher or lower retail prices are observed. Fixed-base indexes do a poor job of capturing changes in welfare after a regime shift, and deviate front the dynamic index by as much as 300 percent. I evaluate the extent to which two recently proposed indexes can approximate the model-derived index. These indexes improve welfare measurement and are str...
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作者：Guerrieri, Veronica; Shimer, Robert
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper explores price formation when sellers are privately informed about their preferences and the quality of their asset. There are many equilibria, including a semi-separating one in which each seller's price depends on a one-dimensional index of her preferences and asset quality. This multiplicity does not rely on off-the-equilibrium path beliefs and so is not amenable to standard signaling game refinements. The semi-separating equilibrium may not be Pareto efficient, even if it is not...
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作者：Heinsalu, Sander
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This article studies costly signaling. The signaling effort is chosen in multiple periods and observed with noise. The signaler benefits front the belief of the market, not directly from the effort or the signal. Optimal signaling behavior in time-varying environments trades off effort-smoothing and influencing belief exactly when it yields a return. If the return to signaling first increases over time and then decreases, then the optimal effort rises slowly, reaches its maximum before the ret...
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作者：Chandra, Ambarish; Lederman, Mara
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We revisit the relationship between competition and price discrimination. Theoretically, we show that if consumers differ in terms of both their underlying willingness-to-pay and their brand loyalty, competition may increase price differences between some consumers while decreasing them between others. Empirically, we find that competition has little impact at the top or the bottom of the price distribution but a significant impact in the middle, thus increasing some price differentials but de...
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作者：Cosaert, Sam
作者单位：KU Leuven
摘要：When consumers care not only for the quantity but also the value of a product, it could he rational to purchase products as they become more expensive. This study provides nonparametric revealed preference-conditions to measure consumers' marginal willingness to pay for value (i.e., diamondness) associated with particular goods. This is the first nonparametric test of price-dependent preferences. The proposed diamondness measure is applied to observational data from the Russia Longitudinal Mon...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Varas, Felipe
作者单位：Stanford University; Duke University
摘要：We study firm's incentives to build and Maintain reputation-for quality, when quality is persistent and can be certified cost. We characterize all reputation-dependent MPEs. They vary in frequency of certification and payoffs. Low payoffs arise in equilibria because of over-certification traps. We contrast the MPEs with. the highest payoff equilibria. Industry certification standards can help firms coordinate on such good equilibria. The optimal equilibria allow firms to maintain high quality ...
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作者：Quint, Daniel; Hendricks, Kenneth
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：When selling a business by auction, sellers typically use indicative bids nonbinding preliminary bids to select a small number of bidders to conduct due diligence and submit binding offers. We show that if entry into the auction is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly increasing strategies, with bidders pooling over a finite number of bids. The equilibrium helps the seller select high value bidders with higher likelihood, although the highest value...
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作者：Bertoletti, Paolo; Etro, Federico; Simonovska, Ina
作者单位：University of Pavia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We develop a general equilibrium model of trade that features indirectly additive preferences and heterogeneous firms. Monopolistic competition generates markups that are increasing in firm productivity and in destination country per capita income, but independent from destination population, as documented empirically. The gains from trade liberalization are lower than in models hosed on CES preferences, and the difference is governed by the average pass-through. When we calibrate the model so...
