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作者：Cai, Hongbin; Feng, Hong; Weng, Xi
作者单位：Peking University; Harbin Institute of Technology
摘要：We consider a three-member organization in which one member retires in each period and the incumbent members vote to admit a candidate to fill the vacancy. Candidates differ in quality center dot and belong to one of two types, and majority-type members share the total rent of that period. We characterize the symmetric Markov equilibria with undominated strategies and compare the long-term welfare among them. Unanimity voting is better than majority voting at promoting long-term welfare. In ad...
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作者：Kimya, Meat
作者单位：Koc University
摘要：It is well known that decision makers do not always consider all of the available alternatives when making a choice. When the alternatives have attributes, these attributes provide a natural way to form the consideration set. I assume a procedure in which the decision maker uses the relative ranking of the alternatives on each attribute to reduce the size of the choice set. I provide a characterization of the procedure and illustrate how to identify the underlying preference and consideration ...
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作者：Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto
作者单位：Hanken School of Economics; University of Jyvaskyla; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Aalto University; KU Leuven
摘要：How many cartels are there, and how long do they live? The answers to these questions are important in assessing the need for competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that takes into account that often it is not known whether a cartel exists or not. We take the model to data from a period of legal cartels-Finnish manufacturing industries 1951-1990. Our estimates suggest that once born, cartels are persistent; by the end of the period, almost all industries were cartelized.
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作者：Lipnowski, Elliot; Mathevet, Laurent
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：We study how a benevolent expert should disclose information to an agent with psychological concerns. We first provide a method to compute an optimal information policy for many psychological traits. The method suggests, for instance, that an agent suffering from temptation a la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) should not know what he is missing, thereby explaining observed biases as an optimal reaction to costly self-control. We also show that simply recommending actions is optimal when the agent i...
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作者：Zhu, John Y.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In many jobs, the worker generates only subjective performance measures privately observed by the employer, and contracts must rely on employer reports about these measures. This setting is a game with private monitoring, and prior work suggests that the optimal contract may be complex and non-recursive. I introduce a novel equilibrium refinement and show that the optimal contract simplifies to an efficiency wage contract: The worker receives a wage above his outside option and reports take a ...
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作者：Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard; Sarpca, Sinan
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Koc University
摘要：A model of majority choice of voucher characteristics with quantitative counterpart explains observed income eligibility requirements for educational vouchers. Households differ by income and preference for religious schooling. They elect a policy maker who chooses public school expenditure, a voucher, a maximum income for voucher eligibility, and a tax to finance public expenditure. Equilibrium has a voucher below per student public expenditure, an eligibility threshold near 300 percent of th...
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作者：Andreoni, James
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The fear of moral hazard-especially in the age of internet commerce-can depress or prevent profitable trades. Experiments show, however, that many people prefer honesty to deceit and would not succumb to moral hazard. This paper asks whether we can find a simple, voluntary institution that can empower moral traders, drive out amoral ones, reduce moral hazard, and restore profitable trade to markets. I find that selling goods with a satisfaction guarantee, accompanied by potentially minor legal...
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作者：Kawai, Kehchi; Lang, Ruitian; Li, Hongyi
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper explores the origins of policy complexity. It studies a model where policy is difficult to undo because policy elements are entangled with each other. Policy complexity may accumulate as successive policymakers layer new' rules upon existing policy. Complexity emerges and persists in balanced democratic polities, when policymakers are ideologically extreme, and when legislative frictions impede policymaking. Complexity begets complexity: simple policies remain simple, whereas comple...
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作者：Galavotti, Stefano; Moretti, Luigi; Valbonesi, Paola
作者单位：University of Padua; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We study bidding behavior by firms in beauty-contest auctions, i.e., auctions in which the winning bid is the one that gets closest to some function (average) of all submitted bids. Using a dataset on public procurement beauty-contest auctions, we show that firms' observed bidding behavior departs from equilibrium and can be predicted by a sophistication index, which captures the firms' capacity of bidding close to optimality in the past. We show that our empirical evidence is consistent with ...
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作者：Krasnokutskaya, Elena; Terwiesch, Christian; Tiererova, Lucia
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We invoke the insights from the auction literature to study trade in services using data from an online market for programming support. We find that the observed clustering of trade between countries can be rationalized through a model featuring endogenous sorting of sellers who are heterogeneous in both quality and costs across projects offered by buyers who differ in outside option and willingness to pay for quality. To accommodate the possibility of such an outcome we extend a single-auctio...
