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作者：Kennes, John; Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
作者单位：Aarhus University; Dalhousie University
摘要：In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools' priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in ...
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作者：Chen, Cheng; Suen, Wing
作者单位：Clemson University; University of Hong Kong; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Several classes of models of hierarchical organizations share two common properties: the characteristics at different levels of the hierarchy are complementary, but this complementarity does not extend beyond adjacent levels. We propose a unified yet simple approach to study comparative statics of organizational characteristics with endogenous number of hierarchical layers in all these models. We use this new approach to study organizational decision making, and show that increased delay cost ...
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作者：Luco, Fernando
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：How does online price disclosure affect competition when both consumers and firms can use the disclosed information? This paper addresses this question exploiting the sequential implementation of an online price-disclosure policy in the Chilean retail gasoline industry. The results show that disclosure increased margins by 9 percent on average, though the effects varied across the country depending on the intensity of local search behavior. Because margins increased the least, and even decreas...
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作者：Luco, Fernando
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：How do different switching costs affect choices and competition in a private pension system? I answer this question in a setting in which variation in employment status allows me to identify two switching costs that jointly affect enrollees' decisions: the cost of evaluating financial information and the cost of the bureaucratic process that enrollees must navigate when switching. I use this variation to estimate the different switching costs and study their impact on competition among pension...
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作者：Romanyuk, Gleb; Smolin, Alex
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Bonn
摘要：Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and decide whether to accept incoming requests. The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. We show full information disclosure leads to a market failure because of excessive rejections by the sellers. If sellers are homogeneous, then coarse information policies are able to restore efficiency. If sellers are heterogeneous, then...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Casamatta, Catherine; Chassagnon, Arnold; Decamps, Jean-Paul
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Tours; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study capital markets in which investors compete by designing financial contracts to control an entrepreneur's ability to side trade and default on multiple loans. We show that covenants may have anticompetitive effects: in particular, they prevent investors from providing additional funds and reduce the entrepreneur's investment capacity. As a result, a large number of inefficient allocations is supported at equilibrium. We propose a subsidy mechanism similar to guarantee funds in financia...
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作者：Bigoni, Maria; Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco
作者单位：University of Bologna; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：We show that monetary exchange facilitates the transition from small to large-scale economic interactions. In an experiment, subjects chose to play an intertemporal cooperation game either in partnerships or in groups of strangers where payoffs could be higher. Theoretically, a norm of mutual support is sufficient to maximize efficiency through large-scale cooperation. Empirically, absent a monetary system, participants were reluctant to interact on a large scale; and when they did, efficiency...
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作者：Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of London; University College London
摘要：Behavioral economics is widely perceived to be part of the profession's shift away from a culture that places abstract theory at its center. I present a critical discussion of the atheoretical style with which behavioral themes are often disseminated: a purely anecdotal style in popular expositions, simplistic cost-benefit modeling in pieces that target a wide audience of academic economists, and the practice of capturing psychological forces by distorting familiar functional forms. I argue th...
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作者：Barron, Daniel; Powell, Michael
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider how a firm's policies constrain its relational contracts. A policy is a sequence of decisions made by a principal; each decision determines how agents' efforts affect their outputs. We consider surplus-maximizing policies in a flexible dynamic moral hazard problem between a principal and several agents with unrestricted vertical transfers and no commitment. If agents cannot coordinate to punish the principal following a deviation, then the principal might optimally implement dynami...
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作者：Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University
摘要：Should a buyer approach sellers of complementary goods informed or uninformed of her private valuations, and if informed, in which sequence? In this paper, we show that an informed buyer would start with the high-value seller to minimize future holdup. Informed (or careful) sequencing may, however, hurt the buyer as sellers read into it. The buyer may, therefore, commit to ignorance, perhaps, by overloading herself with unrelated tasks, delegating the sequencing decision, or letting sellers se...
