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作者：Dai, Weijia; Luca, Michael
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Harvard University
摘要：Collaborating with Yelp and the City of San Francisco, we revisit a canonical example of quality disclosure by evaluating and helping to redesign the posting of restaurant hygiene scores on Yelp.com . We implement a two-stage intervention that separately identifies consumer response to information disclosure and a disclosure design with improved salience-a consumer alert. We find score posting is effective, but improving salience further increases consumer response.
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作者：Hanany, Eran; Klibano, Peter; Mukerji, Sujoy
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Northwestern University; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality-each player's strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents' strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatib...
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作者：Halac, Marina; Kremer, Ilan
作者单位：Yale University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：A manager who learns privately about a project over time may want to delay quitting it if recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation. In the banking industry, managers may want to roll over bad loans. How do distortions depend on expected project quality? What are the effects of releasing public information about quality? A key feature of banks is that managers learn about project quality from bad news, i.e., a default. We show that in such an environment, distortions tend to inc...
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作者：Boik, Andre; Takahashi, Hidenori
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We study how changes in market structure affect how firms engage in second-degree price discrimination. Specifically, we study how a large incumbent cable firm changes its menu of price-quality offerings and mixed bundles in response to entry Competition strongly decreases the rate at which prices increase in quality and induces the incumbent to introduce additional medium- to high-quality offerings that the incumbent could have introduced absent competition but chose not to. Our findings are ...
