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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.; Galeotti, Andrea
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Recent developments in social media have morphed the age-old practice of paying influential individuals for product endorsements into a multibillion dollar industry, extending well beyond celebrity sponsorships. We develop a parsimonious model in which influencers trade off the increased revenue they obtain from paid endorsements with the negative impact that these have on their followers' engagement and, therefore, on the price influencers receive from marketers. The model provides testable p...
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Baranovskyi, Volodymyr; Kolb, Aaron
作者单位：Duke University; University of Rochester; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegation framework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself and must choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. In the focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating an ideological winner's curse. We show that having a second expert can benefit the principal, even when equally or more biased than the first expert. The principal can benefit from commitment to an element of...
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作者：Smolin, Alex
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A principal owns a firm, hires an agent of uncertain productivity, and designs a dynamic policy for evaluating his performance. The agent observes ongoing evaluations and decides when to quit. When not quitting, the agent is paid a wage that is linear in his expected productivity; the principal claims the residual performance. After quitting, the players secure fixed outside options. I show that equilibrium is Pareto efficient. For a broad class of performance technologies, the equilibrium wag...
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作者：Monnet, Cyril; Quintin, Erwan
作者单位：University of Bern; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study efficient exclusion policies in a canonical credit model that features both exogenous and strategic default along the equilibrium path. Policies that maximize welfare in a stationary equilibrium implement exclusion for a finite and deterministic number of periods following default. Front-loading exclusion makes the mass of socially valuable transactions as high as it can be in steady state. Less intuitively, doing so also maximizes the average welfare of excluded agents in equilibrium...
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作者：Reinganum, Jennifer F.; Daughety, Andrew F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We develop a model wherein concerns about prosecutor quality reduce the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with prosecutors. This causes an increase in the crime rate and in wrongly convicted innocent defendants. Because citizens are taxpayers and may be victims, perpetrators, witnesses, or falsely accused defendants, they care about the prosecutor's quality. They update beliefs about this quality based on the disposition of cases. If the prosecutor's believed quality falls below a threshol...
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作者：Fleurbaey, Marc; van der Linden, Martin
作者单位：Princeton University; Emory University
摘要：We study fairness in economies where humans consume one private good and one public good representing the welfare of other species. We show that a social evaluator cannot be egalitarian with respect to humans while always respecting humans' unanimous preferences. One solution is to respect unanimous preferences only when doing so does not lead to a decrease in the welfare of other species. Social preferences satisfying these properties reveal surprising connections between concerns for other s...
