Prosecutor Quality, Witness Participation, Crime, and Reform

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reinganum, Jennifer F.; Daughety, Andrew F.
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200039
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 64-100
• 关键词: rates

摘要

We develop a model wherein concerns about prosecutor quality reduce the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with prosecutors. This causes an increase in the crime rate and in wrongly convicted innocent defendants. Because citizens are taxpayers and may be victims, perpetrators, witnesses, or falsely accused defendants, they care about the prosecutor's quality. They update beliefs about this quality based on the disposition of cases. If the prosecutor's believed quality falls below a threshold, then a majority of voters chooses to replace the prosecutor with a challenger, in expectation of reform. We compare the majority's choice with that of a social planner.